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At least five basicvaluesmight be servedby a robust free speech
principle:(1) individualautonomy;(2) truth seeking;(3) self-government;(4) the checkingof abusesof power;(5) the promotion
of good character.Free speech might serve one or more of these
valuesby functioningin at least three differentways:(1) as a privileged activity;(2) as a socialmechanism;(3) as a culturalforce.My
contentionis that the conventionalunderstandingof the most familiarmetaphorin the FirstAmendmentlexicon,the "marketplace
of ideas,"has had the undesirableeffect of focusingattentiontoo
much on the truthseekingand self-governmentvaluesand on the
functionof free speech as a social mechanism.
The detrimentin this emphasisis threefold.First,the case for a
high level of protectionfor freespeechhasbeen weakenedby being
made to dependtoo much on unconvincingclaimsregardinghow
the phenomenonof provocativespeechfollowedby countervailing
"morespeech"producesa satisfactoryprocessof collectivedelibVincent Blasi is Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School, and
James Madison Distinguished Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamund W. Morgan
Research Professor, The University of Virginia.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Drafts of this paper were vetted by colleagues and workshops too
numerous to list. Their input has improved it immeasurably. I am especially indebted to
Anuj Desai, Alan Hyde, Petros Mavroidis, Richard Posner, Seana Shiffrin, Kim Szurovy,
Jeremy Waldron, and G. Edward White for detailed written comments; to Simon Canick
and JoAnn Koob for extraordinarily helpful research assistance; and to Irene ten Cate for
her insightful student work comparing the free speech philosophies of Holmes and John
Stuart Mill.
? 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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eration. Second, the identificationof the freedomof speech with
the ideal of a well-functioningmarketin ideas has generateddistractingand dangerousregulatoryproposalsthat attemptto redistribute communicativepower as a means of realizingthat ideal.
Third, as a resultof viewingfree speechprimarilyas a plebiscitary
mechanismdesignedto producecollectiveunderstandingand political legitimacy,we have failed to appreciatehow it serves as a
culturalforce that contributesto the control of abusesof power
and the promotionof adaptivecharactertraits.
In this articleI do not attemptto defendthe claimsjust stated.
Rather,I seek to demonstratethatJusticeOliverWendellHolmes's
dissentin Abramsv UnitedStates,1the canonicalopinion that gave
rise to the arrestingfigureof the "marketplaceof ideas,"contains
the seeds of an understandingof the First Amendmentthat has
more to do with checking, character,and culture than with the
implausiblevision of a self-correcting,knowledge-maximizing,
judgment-optimizing, consent-generating, and participationenabling social mechanism.This project of looking beneath the
surfaceof Holmes's metaphoris designednot so much to invoke
the authorityof his statureand eloquenceas to suggestpromising
lines of thought concerningthe value and functionof free speech.
The Abramsdissentis remarkableon manycounts.Its peroration
articulatesin a single paragrapha highly sophisticatedif cryptic
philosophicaljustificationfor the freedomof speech. Surprisingly
perhaps,the paragraphbegins by explainingthe unassailablelogic
of repression:

Persecution
fortheexpression
of opinionsseemsto meperfectly
logical.If you haveno doubtof yourpremisesor yourpower
andwanta certainresultwithallyourheartyounaturally
express
yourwishesin law and sweepawayall opposition.To allow
opposition
byspeechseemsto indicatethatyouthinkthespeech
thecircle,or
impotent,aswhena mansaysthathe hassquared
thatyoudo not carewhole-heartedly
fortheresult,or thatyou
doubteitheryourpoweror yourpremises.2
Then suddenlyHolmes switchesgears,true to his celebratedobservationthirty-eightyearsearlier,"thelife of the law has not been
1250 US 616, 624 (1919).
Id at 630.
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logic: it has been experience."3He notes how prudenceborn of
experienceshouldtemperthe "natural"and "perfectlylogical"desire to extirpate disturbing ideas:

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.4

In perhapshis most daringmove,Holmesthen assertsthatthis prudence is embodiedin the positivelaw of the U.S. Constitution:
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of
our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.5
Next, consistent with his preference for experience over logic as
the source of law, he invokes the authority of history:
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that
the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel
in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived
that the United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it
imposed.6

Finally, Holmes characterizes the First Amendment as a "sweeping
command" subject to limitation only on the occasion of an "emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction
of evil counsels to time."
3 Oliver

Wendell Holmes, Jr., The CommonLaw 5 (1881).

4250 US at 630.

5Id.
6Id.
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As should be apparent,Holmes managedto packinto this paragraphan astonishinglyrich set of allusions.His marketmetaphor
is only one of manysuggestiveand loadedfigurations.Notice, for
example, his pointedly mundane account of religious devotion:
"time has upset many fighting faiths";"we have to wager our
salvationupon some prophecybasedupon imperfectknowledge."
Or his deflatingretort to the Constitutionworshipersof his day:
"It is an experiment,as all life is an experiment."The challenge
for one who would makesense of Holmes is to avoidbeing swept
away by any one of his seductiveformulations.To that end, we
must try to understandhis marketmetaphorin the light of the
observationsand judgmentsthat surroundit in the Abramsperoration.Consideringthe metaphorin isolationcan leadto a failure
to appreciatewhat it has to offer, as well as an inaccurateaccount
of Holmes's surprisinglycoherentargumentfor a robustfreedom
of speech.
I.

EQUILIBRIUM

"The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself acceptedin the competitionof the market."7
This statement,
with
his
call
for
"free
in
trade
ideas,"8might suggestthat
together
Holmes based his interpretationof the First Amendmenton the
assumptionthat ideasshouldbe evaluatedthe way consumergoods
andservicesare:not by anykindof politicalor intellectualauthority
but ratherby an open-endedprocessthat measuresand integrates
the ongoing valuationsof all the individualswho comprisethe relevantcommunity.In this view,the crucialconceptis "equilibrium,"
the balanceof valuationsat any given moment.The benefitof free
speech is its role in generatingthe individualchoices regarding
ideas,and the publicawarenessof those choices,that addup to the
equilibriumof the moment. In supportof this interpretation,we
might note that Holmes once claimedthat "thefunctionof private
ownershipis to divinein advancethe equilibriumof socialdesires."9
On anotheroccasionhe asked:"Whatproximatetest of excellence
can be found except correspondenceto the actualequilibriumof
7Id.

8Id.
9 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the
Court, in CollectedLegal Papers 294 (1920).
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force in the community-that is, conformityto the wishes of the
dominantpower?"'?
Holmes was interestedin economics.In ThePath of theLawhe
famouslysaid: "For the rationalstudy of the law the black-letter
man may be the man of the present,but the man of the futureis
the man of statisticsand the masterof economics.""He sprinkled
his correspondencewith approvingreferencesto the first-everprofessionaleconomist,2 the statisticallymindedsage of scarcityand
diminishingreturns,T. R. Malthus.Holmesonce told HaroldLaski:
"I am a devoutMalthusian."13
In a differentletter to Laskihe reported:"FredPollock speaksof SaintJane (Austen).I shall speak
When LaskidescribedAdamSmithas "avery
of SaintMalthus."14
writer
and
the
best observerof his time;I knownothing like
great
Holmeswroteback:
his bookin the whole of economicliterature,"15
"I am with you on Smith'sWealthof Nations.I was staggeredwhen
Marx patronizedhim."'6Earlierhe had complainedto Laski:"I
never read a socialistyet . . . and I have read a number,that I
We can be confidentthat Holmes was
didn'tthink talkeddrool."17
'0 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Montesquieu,in id at 250, 258.
O
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 469 (1897).
Oliver
12
See William J. Barber, A History of EconomicThought 57 (1967) ("History").
13 Letter from Holmes to Harold
J. Laski (Sept 16, 1924), in Mark De Wolfe Howe,
ed, 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters 658-59 (1953).
14 Letter from Holmes to Laski
(June 14, 1927), in 2 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 950. See
also Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec 9, 1921), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 385 ("In
short I believe in Malthus-in the broad-not bothering about details."); Letter from
Holmes to Laski (July 23, 1925), id at 762 ("But I look at men through Malthus's glassesas like flies-here swept away by a pestilence-there multiplying unduly and paying for
it."); Letter from Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Sept 2, 1914), in James Bishop Peabody, ed,
Holmes-EinsteinLetters 99 (1964) ("I was delighted with Malthus and his quiet, English,
unemphatic way of expressing penetrating thought over which a modern German sociologist or Mathew Arnold would have cackled for half a volume."). See also Letter from
Holmes to Laski (July 30, 1920), in 2 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 272.
151 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 471 (cited in note 13).
16Id at 474. See also id at 161.
17 Id at 96. In a
subsequent letter to Laski, Holmes expatiated further on his preference
for the capitalist worldview: "I don't at all agree to describing [capitalism's] tyrannies with
resentment, as coming from bad men when you gloss those on the other side. I think that
most of the so-called tyrannies of capital express the economic necessities created by the
pressure of population-a pressure for which capitalism is not responsible and for which
communism has offered no remedy. If I praised or blamed (which I don't) either one, I
should blame the communists as consciously and voluntarily contemplating their despotism
whereas on the other side it is largely unconscious and the automatic result of the situation.
I may add that class for class I think the one that communism would abolish is more
valuable-contributes more, a great deal more, than those whom Communism exalts." 2
Holmes-LaskiLetters at 945 (cited in note 13).
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familiarwith and sympatheticto the generalworldviewand many
of the specificobservationsof the laissez-faireeconomists.But as
is often the casewith Holmes,'8we knowmoreaboutwhichthinkers
he likedthanaboutexactlywhathe likedin theirwork.AdamSmith,
T. R. Malthus,David Ricardo,and their cohortshad manyideasandmanydisagreements-aboutthe virtuesandlimitationsof markets.19Which,if any,mightHolmeshavedrawnuponin formulating
his understandingof the freedomof speech?
Should we, for example,read Holmes as resting his defense of
free speech on the assumptionthat a cognitive Invisible Hand
continually generates informational, critical, and rhetorical correctives that keep patterns of belief in a welfare-maximizing state
of dynamic equilibrium? Someone who took this claim to be the
underpinning of Holmes's marketplace theory might question
whether the process by which ideas are generated, disseminated,
and validated in contemporary mass culture accurately measures
and fairly computes the beliefs of the individuals who constitute
the society.20
One reason to doubt the efficacy of the market mechanism as
a means of ordering beliefs derives from the concept, well recognized by economists, of market failure.2"Except in models, markets are imperfect. Differential access to information distorts markets.22Collective behavior can distort markets.23So too can free
riders: persons who are in a position to benefit from the transactions of others without having to pay the price.24A different
type of "externality"undermines efficiency when the full quantum
of social costs generated by an activity cannot practically be ob18See

Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan L Rev 787, 788 (1989).
See Davide Fiaschi and Rodolfo Signorino, ConsumptionPatterns, Developmentand
Growth:Adam Smith, David Ricardoand ThomasRobertMalthus, 10 Euro J Hist Economic
Thought 5 (2003).
20
See, for example, C. Edwin Baker, Human Libertyand Freedomof Speech12-17 (1989)
("Human Liberty");Owen Fiss, LiberalismDivided 9-10, 17-20 (1996).
21
See, for example, Alvin I. Goldman and James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free
Market for Ideas, 2 Legal Theory 1, 19-26 (1996); Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe,
Freedomof Speechvs. EfficientRegulationin Marketsfor Ideas, 17 J Econ Behav & Org 217
(1992).
22
See Hal R. Varian, IntermediateMicroeconomics630-50 (4th ed 1996); Goldman and
Cox, 2 Legal Theory at 19-23 (cited in note 21).
23 See
Varian, IntermediateMicroeconomicsat 458-79 (cited in note 22).
24
Id at 616-18; Richard Posner, Free Speechin an EconomicPerspective,20 Suffolk U L
Rev 1, 19-24 (1986).
19

1]

HOLMESANDTHEMARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS

7

served, measured,or assessed against those who engage in the
activity.25

If the marketsfor goodsandservicesareproneto suchdistortions,
the marketfor ideas would seem to be especiallydivergentfrom
the economists'ideal.26Individualsand groupswho would peddle
their ideas to the public enjoy enormouslydisparateaccessto the
channelsof mass communication.To a greaterdegreethan is true
for commodityand servicemarkets,culturalaffinitiesand psychological predispositionsdistort the way ideas are bought and sold,
asdoesthe factthatsomeideasaremoreeasilypackagedthanothers.
Differencesamonghumansin such capacitiesas articulatenessand
comprehensionalso contributeto marketfailure:ideas that favor
intelligent,well-spokenpeople-the priorityaccordedhigher educationmightbe one example-have a distinctandunfairadvantage
in the marketplace.In most speech settings, the audiencecould
And as
fairlybe describedas a veritableconventionof free riders.27
FrederickSchauerhas demonstrated,the costs createdby speech
are seldom borne by the speakers.28
One canimaginea regulatoryregimedesignedto corrector mitigate these disparitiesandexternalities.Somereformershavefound
in Holmes's marketmetaphora justificationfor variousgovernmental interventionsthat would attempt to redistributecommunicativeopportunity.29
Opponentsof suchreformshavearguedthat
25
This disability can derive from inadequately defined property rights, see Varian, IntermediateMicroeconomicsat 561 (cited in note 22), from the fact that some social costs
take the form of the loss or diminution of "goods" the very character of which prevents
them from being computed or realized in the idiom of private property or revealed preferences, see Elizabeth Anderson, Valueand Ethics in Economics144-47 (1993) ("Valueand
Ethics"),or from physical and epistemological limitations in observing and understanding
causal relationships.
26
For an argument that in terms of economic analysis the market for ideas is probably
more in need of regulation, due to greater externalities, than the market for goods, see
R. H. Coase, The Marketfor Goodsand the Marketfor Ideas, 64 Am Econ Rev: Papers &
Proc 384 (1974).
27
Judge Posner regards the free rider phenomenon to be especially important in the
case of political speech. See Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 19-22 (cited in note 24). For
an elaboration of the implications of viewing free speech as a public good due in part to
the prevalence of audience free riders, see Daniel A. Farber, Free Speechwithout Romance:
Public Choiceand the First Amendment, 105 Harv L Rev 554 (1991).
28
See Frederick Schauer, UncouplingFree Speech,92 Colum L Rev 1321 (1992).
29
See, for example, Fiss, LiberalismDivided at 17-21 (cited in note 20); Cass R. Sunstein,
Democracyand the Problemof Free Speech 16 (1993); Jerome A. Barron, Accessto the PressA New First AmendmentRight, 80 Harv L Rev 1641 (1967); David Cole, First Amendment
Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Fairein CampaignFinance, 9 Yale L & Policy Rev 236, 239-45
(1991); Charles Lawrence III, If He HollersLet Him Go:RegulatingRacistSpeechon Campus,
1990 Duke LJ 431, 466-73.
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the interventionof governmentin the realmof speech is likely to
take us even furtherfrom the free marketideal so far as the distributionof communicativeinfluenceis concerned.30
However,before the conceptof marketfailureor successis deemedto haveany
kind of FirstAmendmentrelevancederivingfrom Holmes'smemorablefigureof speech,we must confrontthe fundamentalobjection that ideas cannotproperlybe treatedas consumergoods, that
discussion and persuasioncannot be analogizedto competitive
exchange.31If we pursue the analogy beyond the first level, the
strengthof this objectioncan be appreciated.
Marketsforgoodsandservicesgeneratepricesandlevelsof output.
A marketfor ideas generatesa collectionof individualbeliefsand,
in some sense, the productionof observationsandarguments.Scarcity,both of productionandconsumptionresources,is the phenomenon that drivesmarketsfor goods and services.(For this purpose,
informationis bettertreatedas a "good"thanan "idea.")Scarcityof
a sort also limits what ideas can be believedand communicated:a
personmust choosewhetherto believep or not-p;she must decide
which few ideas from a nearlyinfiniteuniversewill commandher
finiteattentionandwhichof hernumerousthoughtsshewill attempt
to disseminate.Nevertheless,the generationand consumptionof
ideasis characterized
by choicesthat are less stark,less categorical,
less discrete-more qualified,more variegated,more continual,more
reversible, more nuanced, more synergistic, more holistic-than are
the choices faced by producers and consumers of most goods and
services. One reason for this difference is that the process of transmitting ideas, even in the large and among strangers,has dimensions
of cooperation, reciprocity, and mutual ongoing identification-a
bonding, if mainly symbolic, between the sender and the receiverthat are not endemic to the phenomenon of competitive exchange
in product markets, the efficiency of which is a function of their
capacity to execute discrete impersonal transactions.Moreover, the
production of an idea does not deplete resources available to the
30
See, for example, Lillian R. BeVier, The InvisibleHand of the Marketplaceof Ideas, in
Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds, Eternally Vigilant:Free Speechin the Modern
Era 232 (2002); L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speechand the Newer FirstAmendment, 1982 Supreme
Court Review 243, 280-84; Charles Fried, The New First AmendmentJurisprudence:A
Threat to Liberty, 59 U Chi L Rev 225, 250-53 (1992); Ronald W. Adelman, The First
Amendmentand the Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 Ariz L Rev 1125 (1996).
31
See, for example, Anderson, Valueand Ethics at 158-63 (cited in note 25); Margaret
Jane Radin, ContestedCommodities164-83 (1996).
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produceras occurs when productionprioritiesare establishedregardinggoods and services;more often the productionof an idea
createsadditionalintellectualresourcesthatfacilitatefutureproduction. Similarly,whenone consumer"buys"an idea,the supplyof that
ideaavailableto otherconsumersis not therebydiminished.In these
respects,the phenomenonof scarcitydoes not determinehow ideas
aresociallyorderedin quitethe wayit determinesthe allocationand
distributionof conventional"rivalrous"
goods and services.
Nor do substitutioneffects, a criticalcomponentof microeconomic analysis,32
operatein the realmof ideas the way they do in
marketsfor goods and services.Appealingideas do not command
less assentwhen ideas that are almost but not quite as appealing
become availableat a lower price.One reasonis that the veryconcept of "price"is problematicwhen the object of consumptionis
ideas.What is it that a personmust give up in orderto "consume"
an idea other than the opportunityto believe conflictingideas?33
The formingof a belief sometimesentailscosts to one'sreputation,
andperhapsto one's senseof personalidentity,suchthatalternative
beliefs that exact less of a price in these terms might representa
better "bargain"for the consumer.But even if availablesubstitutes
sometimes figure in the process of belief formationin this odd
manner,the impactof such behavioron the aggregatedemandfor
an idea is not somethingthat contributesto an "efficient"outcome
in the socialprojectof truthseeking.If beliefsare consideredvaluable primarilyfor their expressivefunctionby whichpersonsforge
identitiesand makeinterpersonalconnections,34
the choice to embrace a less costly substitutebelief entails,if not consciousinsincerity, at least cognitive dissonancethat would seem to call into
questionthe expressivevalueof the belief so chosen,assumingthat
it is even possibleto choose to "believe"a less costly substitute.If,
on the other hand, the instrumentalvalue of a belief-its contribution to future thought and conduct-is to be emphasized,the
practiceof intellectualavoidanceanddenialis not likelyto generate
eitherthe cognitivecommitmentor the cognitiveresourcesthatits
practitionerswill need to serve their personalutility functionsin
See Varian, IntermediateMicroeconomics
at 38-40, 48-52, 111-12 (cited in note 22).
See Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledgein a Social World203-04 (1999).
34 For an argument that
many exchanges, not only of ideas, serve such expressive purposes
and for that reason ought not to be governed by market norms, see Anderson, Valueand
Ethics at 150-58 (cited in note 25).
32
33
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the face of the choices with which they will be confrontedby the
ever-changingcourseof events.Whatevercollectivebeliefpatterns
emerge from this phenomenonof intellectualsubstitutioncannot
be considereda socially functionalequilibriumanalogousto the
equilibriumthat resultswhen availablesubstitutesinformproducer
and consumerchoices in the realmof goods and services.
The analogybreaksdown over the concept of price in another
respect, moreover.In a commodityor servicemarket,at a given
point in time there is such a thing as a marketprice;participants
in the marketignore that price at their peril. Possiblyone could
analogizea currentconsensusof belief,if suchtherebe, to a market
price, but can we say that participantsin the marketfor ideas are
boundto respondto the currentconsensusin anythinglike the way
economicactorsmustrespondto the marketprice?It is, of course,
true that someone trying to "sell"an idea ordinarilywill want to
takeinto accountthe prevailingbaselineof beliefin decidingwhich
potentialbuyersto addressand with what kindsof appeals.Moreover, inertiaprobablyplaysas large a role in belief formationand
retentionas in consumptiondecisionsregardingconventionalgoods
andservices.In fact,one couldturnto Holmesforthe bestaphorism
on this point:"property,friendship,and truthhavea commonroot
in time."35
Nevertheless,ideasthatdefythe currentconsensusoften
get "consumed"in ways that are not replicatedfor materialgoods
that languishon the shelvesbecausethey are pricedtoo far above
the going marketrate. Such ideas can be the seeds of futureintellectual,cultural,andpoliticalgrowth.They alsocanprovidecurrent
value for dissidentthinkerstoo idiosyncratic,too reticent,or too
isolatedto constituteeven a niche market.
The analogycannot be saved by switchingthe focus from the
mechanismof pricesettingto the processof consumerchoice.In a
commodityor servicemarket,consumersare expectedmuch of the
time to be self-interestedin a rathernarrowsense.The aggregation
of individualpreference-maximizing
decisions provides the best
availablemeasureof whatpeoplewant,andhencewhatought to be
andwill be produced.In this regard,thereis a normativedimension
to the conceptof a commodityor servicemarket.I doubtthatanyone
would contendas a normativematterthat consumerchoice in the
marketfor ideasshouldbe self-interestedto anythinglike the same
35Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 Harv L Rev 40 (1918).
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degreeas in economicmarkets.We do not wantlistenersandreaders
to be lookingsimplyforideasthatwill bestservetheirpersonalneeds
narrowlyconceivedto encompassonly privateuse. We expectthem
to be, in one wayor another,searchingfor ideasthatarevaluablein
a broadersense. In decidingwhat to believe, consumersof ideas
should and do take into accountthe desires,needs, opinions,and
experiencesof other people.We also expectconsumersof ideasto
believesome thingsthey wishwerenot so. The socialvalueof ideas
lies to a largeextentin how theirproductionandconsumptiongeneratesbenefitsover time for personsotherthanthe immediateproducersand consumers.Such positiveexternalitiesare likely to be
greaterthe less ephemeralandparochial,andhence personalto the
point of being inapplicableto others,are the choicesmade by the
immediateconsumersof the ideas.
Of course,decisionsto consumegoods and servicesalso are not
self-interested
andshort-sighted.
Oftenconsumersof goods
invariably
and servicesmaketheir selectionsmotivatedin partby focusedaltruismor generalizedsocialresponsibility.But that phenomenonis
not reallyanalogousto whatoccurswhenconsumersof ideasdecide,
sometimesreluctantly,whatto believe.The fundamentaldifference
is that even when economicconsumptionis not narrowlyself-interested, the phenomenonof discretionarychoice predominatesto a
degreethatis not replicatedin the formationof beliefs.Evenif one
holds that thereis no such thing as a mind-independent
Truth"out
there,"even if one believesthatthe measureof an idea'struthis the
practicaleffect of adoptingit, even if one thinksthat realityis irreduciblya functionof perspective,the experienceof holdinga genuine belief entailsa qualityof personalidentificationand (at least
temporary)commitmentthat is approximated
by only the most unusualof consumerpurchases.Holmes put the point succinctlywhen
he characterized
his beliefsashis "can'thelps,"36
andthe drivingideas
of commonlaw developmentas "feltnecessities."37
36 Letter from Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock
(Oct 27, 1901), in Mark D. Howe, ed,
1 Holmes-PollockLetters at 100 (1941) ("all I mean by truth is the road I can't help travelling"); id at 139 ("all I mean by truth is what I can't help thinking"); Letter from Holmes
to Laski (Jan 11, 1929), in 2 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 1124 (cited in note 13) ("[W]hen I
say that a thing is true I only mean that I can't help believing it-but I have no grounds
for believing that my can't helps are cosmic can't helps-and some reasons for thinking
otherwise. I therefore define the truth as the system of my intellectual limitations-there
being a tacit reference to what I bet is or will be the prevailing can't help of the majority
of that part of the world that I count.").
37 Holmes, The CommonLaw at 5 (cited in note 3).
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All the more problematicis the analogy of ideas to economic
resourceswhen the productionfunctionis takeninto account.To
a largeextent,ideasarenot generatedin responseto demand.Nor
would we want them to be. We even have a derogatoryterm for
the practice:pandering.(Again,notice that informationis different.) The expressiverewardof producingan idea makesthat experience a form of sociallyvaluable"consumption"by the author
even of an idea that convincesno one. Moreover,ideas that are
not selling often servea social functionpreciselybecausethey can
be productivelyused-as foils, as partialtruths to be selectively
scavenged, as options available for future use as conditions
change38-by personswho do not "buy"them at the time they are
placed on the market.There are, of course, analogiesin the way
that economic goods and servicesgeneratevalue to personswho
either produce them or use them for purposesother than consumption. Some entrepreneursoffer goods and services in the
spirit of self-expression.Most buyers develop their consumption
preferencesby learningfrom the possibilitiesand pitfallsof products they decidenot to purchase.Buthere the differencesof degree
are telling. The nonconsumptionsources of social value are not
integral to economic production in the way that the sincerity,
integrity,and personalidentificationof the speakersand the multifarious,radiating,and delayeduses of ideas actuallyconstitutea
majorpart of their value.
These comparisonssuggest that the sources of social value in
the marketfor ideas are so differentfrom those in conventional
economic marketsthat one cannot persuasivelydevelop a philosophy of free speech by drawingupon the insightsof classicaland
neoclassical economics regardingthe interaction of supply and
demand.In a way, Holmes acknowledgedthis. In their extended
and intellectuallyrich correspondence,FrederickPollocktriedrepeatedlyto get Holmes to readAlfredMarshall,the doyen of the
neoclassicalmovementin economicsand the writerwho by working out the implicationsof marginalanalysisput the concept of
equilibrium at the center of microeconomic theory. Here is
Holmes's response:"I do not get much nourishmentexceptwhen
the writers [on economics]become sociological(I remembergetting much pleasurefrom Adam Smith becausethere he gives his
38 Each of these sources of the value of ideas was
emphasized by Mill. See John Stuart
Mill (David Bromwich and George Kateb, eds), On Liberty97-98, 103-17 (2003).

OF IDEAS
HOLMESANDTHEMARKETPLACE

1]

13

generalviews of life). So I havebeen excusingmyselffromreading
your Marshall."39
II.

SKEPTICISM

If Holmes's markettheory of the First Amendmentdoes
not rest upon a conceptionof cognitivefine-tuningvia the elegant
equilibrium-seekingmechanicsof neoclassicaleconomics,on what
does it rest?What "generalviewsof life"didhe findin the sociology
of the market?Perhapswhat Holmes liked aboutmarketsis their
nonprescriptivecharacter,embodiedin their designedfunctionof
enablingparticipantsto implementtheir understandingsand preferenceswhatever(withinbroadlimits) they might be. Recall that
his referencesquoted above40to the phenomenonof equilibrium
were not to a supposedcognitiveequilibriumbut rather to "the
equilibriumof social desires"and "the equilibriumof actualforce
in the community."His invocationof the marketmetaphorin the
Abramsperorationmay have been to make the point that truth
reducesto choice. Perhapsthe imagerythat we should take from
Holmes's figureof speechis not that of a highly structuredpricedeterminingmarketsuchas a stockexchange,a mechanismdesigned
to achieve plebiscitaryand transactionalprecision, but rather a
a site for spontaneousand prochoice-proliferatingmarketplace,
miscuous browsing,comparing,tasting, and wishing, a paean to
Appliedto ideas,the imperipateticsubjectivityamidabundance.41
evokes
intellectual
age
serendipity.
39Letter from Holmes to Pollock (July 28, 1911), in 1 Holmes-PollockLetters at 183
(cited in note 36). On Marshall's role in developing general equilibrium theory, see Barber,
History at 168-97 (cited in note 12).
40 See notes 9 and 10.
41 The second earliest reference to a
"marketplace" of (or for) ideas that I have been
able to discover, in either legal or popular discourse, uses the metaphor in precisely this
sense. Touting the forthcoming 1939 New York World's Fair, Grover A. Whalen, the
exhibition's president, boasted that conditions affecting lives in every category would be
shown, together with all the possibilities existing in science, art, medicine, mechanics,
education, play, and industry: "The fair, planned to entertain and delight every one with
its beauty, its comfort, its magnificence, and its variegated amusements will be a market
place for ideas, the birthplace of a wonderful new era." New York Times 27 (Oct 9, 1936).
One year earlier, David M. Newbold wrote a letter to the New YorkTimes in which he
reassured readers that if neither Herbert Hoover nor William Borah, the ideal candidates,
were willing to challenge President Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election, "then their
likes will issue not from a dark room at 2 o'clock in the morning, but as the result of
men and ideas competing in the market place of ideas where public opinion is formed."
New York Times 14 (Dec 28, 1935). So far as I can tell, Mr. Newbold deserves the prize
for first transforming Holmes's "competition of the market" into a "marketplaceof ideas."
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Holmes certainlywas a pluralist.Throughouthis adultlife, in a
varietyof intellectualendeavors,he displayedan instinctiveaversion
to assertionsof "absolute"truth. He wrote to John Wu: "I don't
believeor knowanythingaboutabsolutetruth."42
He once described
truthas "themajorityvote of thatnationthatcouldlickall others."43
In a lawreviewarticlepublishedthe yearbeforehe wrotetheAbrams
colorful terms his
dissent, Holmes expressedin characteristically
utter disdainfor absolutistmodes of thought:
There is in all men a demandfor the superlative,so much so
that the poor devilwho has no otherway of reachingit attains
it by getting drunk.It seems to me that this demandis at the
bottomof the philosopher'seffortto provethattruthis absolute
and of the jurist'ssearchfor criteriaof universalvaliditywhich
he collectsunderthe head of naturallaw.4
His pluralism born of skepticism permeates his writings. In the
critique of natural law just quoted, Holmes explained further his
aversion to transcendent truth claims:
What we most love andreveregenerallyis determinedby early
associations.I love graniterocksandbarberrybushes,no doubt
becausewith themweremy earliestjoysthatreachbackthrough
the past eternity of my life. But while one's experiencethus
makescertainpreferencesdogmaticfor oneself,recognitionof
how they cameto be so leavesone ableto see that others,poor
souls, may be equallydogmaticaboutsomethingelse. And this
againmeansscepticism.45
Holmes called himself a skeptic, as did his admirers, but Grant
Gilmore found that his skepticism crossed the border into cynicism:
Put out of your head the pictureof the tolerantaristocrat,the
greatliberal,the eloquentdefenderof our liberties,the Yankee
from Olympus.All that was a myth, concoctedprincipallyby
Harold Laski and Felix Frankfurterabout the time of World
War I. The real Holmes was savage,harsh,cruel,a bitterand
lifelongpessimistwho sawin the courseof humanlife nothing
42
Letter from Holmes to John C. H. Wu (June 16, 1923), in Harry C. Shriver, ed,
Justice Oliver WendellHolmes: His BookNotices and UncollectedLetters and Papers 164, 165
(1936).
43 Holmes, Natural Law at 40
(cited in note 35).
44Id.
45Id at 41.
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but a continuingstrugglein which the rich and the powerful
impose their will on the poor and weak.46
Alexander Meiklejohn considered Holmes's market conception of
truth to be
a fruitfulsourceof intellectualirresponsibilityandof the errors
which irresponsibilitybrings. We Americans,when thinking
in that vein, have takenthe "competitionof the market"principle to mean that as separatethinkers,we haveno obligation
to test our thinking,to makesure that it is worthyof a citizen
who is one of "the rulersof the nation."That testing is to be
done, we believe, not by us, but by "the competitionof the
market."Each one of us, therefore,feels free to think as he
pleases,to believewhateverwill servehis own privateinterests.
. . . [T]he intellectualdegradationwhich that interpretation
of truth-testinghas broughtupon the minds of our people is
almost unbelievable. ...

It has made intellectual freedom in-

distinguishablefromintellectuallicense.Andto thatdisastrous
end the beautifulwords of Mr. Holmes have greatlycontributed.47
What matters here is not the proper label to be attached to
Holmes's view of the world, but whether his irreverent attitude
toward the concept of truth provides a discrediting key to understanding his market metaphor. However irritating may be the pretensions of self-righteous moralists and self-appointed guardiansof
the public interest, we cannot help but be troubled by the cognitive
and normative abyss that Holmes might be understood to embrace.48Moreover, one must ask whether a constitutional interpretation can claim sufficient pedigree if it rests on radical premisesmoral, political, or epistemological-that have never commanded
much assent in the relevant political community. In this regard, the
nihilism that some have discerned in Holmes's concept of truth is
indeed troubling.
There is another problem with grounding a strong free speech
principle on an intensely skeptical attitude toward the concept of
truth. Steven Smith has shown that extreme skepticism is a doubleedged sword in First Amendment analysis.Just as skepticism tends
Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 48-56 (1977).
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom70-71 (1948).
48
A hard-hitting, detailed, and well-informed critique of Holmes in this vein is Albert
W. Alschuler, Law Without Values:The Life, Work,and Legacyof Justice Holmes (2000).
46

47
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to undercutthe argumentsof those who would regulatespeechin
the name of ideologicaldecency,skepticismalso tends to undercut
the argumentsof those who assertthat speech is a specialhuman
constitutional
If truth
protection.49
activitydeservingof extraordinary
and
reduce
to
does
power, as
really
entirely arbitrarypreference
Holmes seems to say in some of his saltiermoments,50why treat
speechdisputesas exceptionalin termsof the principlesof deference
andseparationof powersthatlimitthe judicialrolein a constitutional
democracy?
These are powerfulobjections,but they have purchaseonly if
Holmes's marketmetaphordoes indeed expressan extremeform
of skepticismborderingon nihilism.It does not. Recallthat in his
AbramsdissentHolmes saystwothings abouttruth.First,he states
thatthe competitionof the marketprovidesthe "besttest of truth."
Then he asserts"thattruthis the only groundupon which [men's]
wishessafelycanbe carriedout.""5
This secondstepin the argument
is crucial.Even if we could be confidentthat free speech leads to
truth, the case for protectingspeech in the face of the harmsit
might cause dependson the furtherpropositionthat knowingthe
truthis a value of overridingimportance.52
Holmes apparentlybelievedthat the pursuitof truthis that important.He certainlylived
49 Steven D. Smith,
Skepticism,Tolerance,and Truth in the Theoryof Free Expression,60
S Cal L Rev 649 (1987).

soSee, for example, Holmes, Natural Law at 40 (cited in note 35); Letter from Holmes
to Pollock (Oct 26, 1929), in 2 Holmes-PollockLetters at 255-56 (cited in note 36); Letter
from Holmes to Laski (April 6, 1920), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 259 (cited in note 13).
51 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
52
It is possible to read Holmes's statement "that truth is the only ground upon which
[men's] wishes safely can be carried out" as if the word "that"were italicized so as to shift
the emphasis from "truth" to "that," thereby transforming "that" from a conjunction to
a demonstrative adjective. In this reading, the "truth" he is talking about is simply his
proposed test of truth, not truth in all its manifestations. The interpretative consequence
would be to read Holmes as saying nothing about the priority to be accorded the activity
of truth seeking, but rather as asserting that his market test of truth, as compared with
alternative tests that are more transcendent or inflexible, is to be preferred on grounds
of safety and efficacy. Such a reading cannot be definitively refuted by Holmes's syntax
and rhetorical context. Nevertheless, it is some internal evidence against this revisionist
interpretation that earlier in the same sentence, in clauses structurally parallel to the clause
at issue, Holmes twice used the word "that" as a conjunction rather than an adjective:
"they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired . . . that the best test of
truth .. ." Moreover, Holmes's penchant for discussing metaphysical and epistemological
matters in global albeit humble terms, see text at note 44 and also note 75, together with
his skeptic's disinclination to label his specific controversial claims "truths," leads me to
conclude that Holmes's meaning in this crucial sentence is better captured by reading it
to say "that truth" rather than "that truth," and thus to be asserting the priority of truth
seeking. On the importance in the overall truth-centered argument for the freedom of
speech of this claim that truth seeking has a special social priority, see Frederick Schauer,
Free Speech:A PhilosophicalEnquiry 29 (1982).
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his life as thoughhe did. EdmundWilson particularlyadmiredthis
qualityin Holmes:
He wasnot merelya cultivated
judgewhoenjoyeddippinginto
he wasa real
belleslettresor amusinghimselfwithspeculation:
of thoughtwhohadspecialized
in thelawbutwho
concentrator
man'splace,to definehis satisfactions
wastryingto determine
is. . . In spite
whathumanity
andduties,to tryto understand
and
of his ... fundamental
asto humanconvictions
skepticism
systems. . . he is alwaysalertandattentive,alwaysinquiring
andsearching,
to findout somefurtheranswers.53
One manifestationof Holmes'sinquisitivenesswashis fascination
with science. In Februaryof 1919 the philosopherMorris Cohen
askedHolmes in a letter whetherhis readingof Voltairehad had
an important influence on his views concerning truth.54Holmes

answered:

Ohno-it wasnotVoltaire-itwastheinfluenceof thescientific
wayof lookingat theworld-thatmadethe changeto whichI
referred... . The Originof SpeciesI thinkcameout whileI
wasin college-HerbertSpencerhadannounced
his intention
to put the universeinto our pockets-I hadn'treadeitherof
themto be sure,butas I sayit wasin the air.55
AlthoughHolmes never pursuedscientificknowledgesystematically,he was interestedin the scientificmethod and the role of
sciencein society.During the 1870she participatedin a discussion
groupthat calleditself the MetaphysicalClub.The group'sleader
was, by all accounts,ChaunceyWright, a latter-daySocrateswho
wrote very little, achievedno public recognition,but persistently
challengedhis conversationalpartnerswith the power and probity
of his mind.Wrightwasboth a practicingscientist,trainedin mathematics,biology,and physics,and a philosopherof science.56With
53 Edmund
Wilson, Patriotic Gore:Studies in the Literatureof the American Civil War 781
(1962).
54 Letter from Morris Cohen to Holmes (Feb 3 or 4, 1919), described in Felix Cohen,
9 J Hist Ideas 3, 14 n 27 (1948).
ed, The Holmes-CohenCorrespondence,
55Letter from Holmes to Morris Cohen (Feb 5, 1919), id at 14.
56
Wright was a fascinating character who had an important influence on Holmes. See
note 62; Letter from Holmes to Laski (Nov 29, 1923), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 565
(cited in note 13) ("It seemed to me that [Peirce] was overrated especially allowing for
what he owed to Chauncey Wright ....").
William James also held Wright in awe: "If
power of analytic intellect pure and simple could suffice, the name of Chauncey Wright
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the regularparticipationalsoof WilliamJamesandCharlesSanders
Peirce,both trainedscientistswho becamephilosophers,the MetaphysicalClub providedHolmes with an opportunityto discussthe
natureand meaningof sciencewith some of the ablestthinkersof
his generation.James and Peirce, of course,were later to develop
the philosophyof pragmatism,which buildson a view of truththat
is derivedfrom the scientificmethod.57
Holmes maintainedan interest in science throughouthis life.
Saveonly his book TheCommon
Law,probablyhis most ambitious
"Lawin Science and Science in
entitled
is
an
article
publication
Law,"publishedin the HarvardLawReviewin 1899.58When speaking in 1902 at the dedicationof the NorthwesternUniversityLaw
School building,Holmes said:
If [auniversity
training]couldgiveto everystudenta scientific
pointof view. . . I shouldthinkit hadmorethanpaidforitself.
. I cannotbelievethatanythingelsewouldbe so likelyto
of scientificpremastheuniversal
secureprosperity
acceptance
ises in everydepartmentof thought.59

In the last two decades of his life, Holmes conducteda regular
correspondencewith Morris Cohen, one of the foundersof the
academicdisciplineof philosophyof science.60
would assuredlybe as famousas it now is obscure,for he was not merelythe greatmind
of a village-if Cambridgewill pardonthe expression-but either in London or Berlin
he would, with equal ease, have taken the place of masterwhich he held with us. The
reasonwhy he is now gone withoutleavingany workwhich his friendscan consideras a
fair expressionof his genius, is that his shyness,his want of ambition,and to a certain
degreehis indolence,were almostas exceptionalas his powerof thought."WilliamJames,
Chauncey
Wright,21 The Nation 194 (1875), reprintedin EdwardH. Madden,Chauncey
of Pragmatism143 (1963). The best brief accountof Wright's
Wrightand theFoundations
life and thought that I have found is the chapterdevoted to him in Philip P. Wiener,
For a less
Evolutionand the Foundersof Pragmatism31-69 (1949, 1972) ("Evolution").
flatteringestimateof Wright'soriginalityand influence,see Bruce Kuklick,TheRiseof
AmericanPhilosophy
63-79 (1977).
57For portraitsof the Metaphysical
Clubandits participants,
see LouisMenand,TheMetaClub:A StoryofIdeasinAmerica201-32 (2001)("Metaphysical
Wiener,Evolution
Club");
physical
in America120-216
at 18-30 (1972)(citedin note 56);MortonWhite, Science
andSentiment
withtheleadingpragmatist
(1972).Forperceptiveaccountsof Holmes'scomplexrelationships
thinkers,see Grey,41 StanL Rev at 787 (citedin note 18);DavidA. Hollinger,TheToughMindedJusticeHolmes,
andtheMakingof an American
Icon,in RobertW.
JewishIntellectuals,
Gordon,ed, TheLegacyof OliverWendell
Holmes,
Jr 216-22 (1992).
5

12 Harv L Rev 443 (1899).

9 Address
of ChiefJusticeHolmes,in

RichardA. Posner,ed, TheEssentialHolmes98, 99
(1992).
60 Portions of the
correspondenceare reprintedin Cohen, ed, 9 J Hist Ideas (cited in
note 54).
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As a youngman,Holmes studiedthe writingsofJohn StuartMill,
his influentialaccountof the scientificmethod,A System
particularly
That
ofLogic.61 book canbe viewedas the culminationof the British
empiricisttraditionin philosophy,stretchingback to Locke and
Hume. A key tenet of that traditionis that all propositionsare
subjectto perpetualtesting.And that processof testing,whetherit
takes the form of systematicobservation,controlledexperiment,
logicalderivation,or probabilisticcalculation,mustalwayshold out
at least the possibilitythat priorunderstandingswill be displaced.
Time, afterall, has upset manyscientificlaws.In short,no matter
how elegant and coherentthe explanationand supportivethe current data,we might be wrong.This guidingprinciplehas come to
be calledfallibilism.Both Mill and Holmes believedin it passionIt is noteworthythatHolmes rereadMill's essayOnLiberty,
ately.62
which dependsheavilyon the premiseof fallibilismin arguingfor
the freedomof speech, duringthe earlymonths of 1919, the year
of his Abramsdissent.63
This emphasison fallibilismputs in perspectiveHolmes'smany
breezystatementsaboutthe natureof truth.He discussedthe concept of truth in severalletterswith two of his favoritecorrespondents, Sir FrederickPollock and Harold Laski. On almost every
occasionwhen he spokedismissivelyabouttruth,Holmes included
61

See Mark De Wolfe Howe, Justice Oliver WendellHolmes:The Shaping Years1841-1870
212-17 (1957); Patrick J. Kelley, WasHolmes a Pragmatist?Reflectionson a New Twistto an
Old Argument, 14 SIU L J 427, 436-37 (1990).
62
See Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Aug 30, 1929), in 2 Holmes-PollockLettersat 252
(cited in note 36):
If there is anything that has been supposed to be compulsory upon us short of
not affirming nonsense I should think it was that every phenomenon must have
a cause. Yet I find scientific men suggesting nowadays (e.g. Eddington) that there
are phenomena for which no causes can be discovered and seemingly believing
that they are outside the category of cause and effect. I am far from believing
with them, but I am entirely ready to believe it on proof. Chauncey Wright, a
nearly forgotten philosopher of real merit, taught me when young that I must
not say necessaryabout the universe, that we don't know whether anything is
necessary or not.
See also Letters from Holmes to Laski (Nov 29, 1923 and July 23, 1924), in 1 HolmesLaski Letters at 565, 634 (cited in note 13). For a concise and lucid explanation of Mill's
theory of induction and its relationship to his premise of fallibilism, see John Skorupski,
John Stuart Mill 5-12 (1989). See also Geoffrey Scarre, Mill on Inductionand Scientific
Method, in John Skorupski, ed, The CambridgeCompanionto Mill 112-38 (1998).
63
Letter from Holmes to Laski (Feb 28, 1919), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 187 (cited
in note 13).
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a criticismof moral or intellectualabsolutism.64
After setting out
of
his majority-vote-of-the-strongest-nation
theory truthin Natural
test
of
is
not
the
added:
"Certitude
he
Law,
certainty.We havebeen
cock-sureof manythingsthatwerenot so."65He reservedhis strongest ire for personsand philosophiesthat were not capableof adaptationor reassessment:"Whenyou know that you know perseThe animatingidea of Holmes's book The
cution comes easy."66
CommonLaw is that seeminglyabsoluteprinciplesof law must be
seen in their historicalcontext,studiedwith attentionto theirpatternsof development,and evaluatedaccordingto theiradaptability
I think Holmes would have embracedalto modernconditions.67
most any test of truth that renderedthe concept of an absolute
principleincoherent.He associatedthe rejectionof absolutistthinking with the scientificmethod.
That associationmayhelp us to unpackHolmes'sbugbear."Absolute" could refer to any of a number of propertiesbearingon
the derivation,strength,scope, constancy,purity,singularity,contingency, fundamentality,corrigibility,or exclusivityof a proposition. Recall Holmes's identificationof "the effort to prove that
truth is absolute"with "demandfor the superlative"and "search
for criteria of universalvalidity."68
One might be tempted from
these formulationsto enter Holmes in the lists of variousmodern
debates over moral realism,69moral relativism,70and moral par-

ticularism.71
While his thoughtcan be mappedalongsome of these
64
See, for example, Letters from Holmes to Laski (Feb 26, 1918, April 6, 1920, and
Jan 11, 1929), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 139, 259 (cited in note 13), and 2 Holmes-Laski
Letters at 1124-25; Letter from Holmes to Lady Pollock (Sept 6, 1902), in 1 HolmesPollockLetters at 105 (cited in note 36); Letter from Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Oct
26, 1929), in 2 Holmes-PollockLetters at 255-56.
65
Holmes, Natural Law at 40 (cited in note 35).
66 Letter from Holmes to Pollock
(Aug 30, 1929), in 2 Holmes-PollockLetters at 253
(cited in note 35).
67 See
Benjamin Kaplan, Encounterswith Oliver WendellHolmes,Jr., 96 Harv L Rev 1828,
1829 (1983).
68

See text at note 44.

Compare, for example, Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (1977), and J. L.
Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), with Charles Larmore, The Morals of
Modernity 89-117 (1996).
70 Compare, for example, Bernard Williams, The Truth in Relativism, in Moral Luck 132
(1981), with Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere (1986).
71
Compare, for example, Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons(1993), with Joseph Raz, The
Truth in Particularism,in Engaging Reason(1999).
69
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coordinates-he was a moral relativistand not a moralrealist72
Holmes's focus on fallibilismindicatesthat the absolutismhe rejected with such vehemenceis that which placescertainideas and
practicesbeyondthe need for ongoing evaluationandmodification
in the light of criticism,evidence,experience,changingconditions,
and changing"feltnecessities."Stasisand certitudebotheredhim
more than conceptual overreach or metaphysicalpretension.73
This aversionto intellectualrigidity,surelyan attributeof all wise
persons but peculiarlycentral to Holmes's thought, transcends
differencesover moral realism,relativism,and particularism.
Indeed,such was Holmes'sbroad-rangingcuriositythat he even
liked to ponder elusiveintimationsregardingthe mysteriesof the
universe.Here is how he concludesThePathof the Law:
The remoterandmoregeneralaspectsof the law are those
whichgiveit universal
interest.It is throughthemthatyounot
become
a
in yourcalling,but connectyour
master
only
great
with
the
universe
and
catchan echoof the infinite,a
subject
law.74
glimpseof itsunfathomable
process,ahintof theuniversal
This passageis not aberrational.
Addressinghis Harvardclassmates
on the occasionof their fortiethreunion,Holmes observed:
Lifeis a roarof bargainandbattle,butin the veryheartof it
thererisesa mysticspiritualtone that givesmeaningto the
whole.It transmutes
the dulldetailsinto romance.It reminds
us thatouronlybutwhollyadequate
is as partsof
significance
the unimaginable
whole.It suggeststhatevenwhilewe think
thatwe areegotistswe arelivingto endsoutsideourselves.75
72 For an
especially illuminating overview of Holmes's theory of value, see David Luban,
Justice Holmes and the Metaphysicsof Judicial Restraint, 44 Duke L J 449, 461-88 (1994).
73 See Holmes, 10 Harv L Rev at 466
(cited in note 11) ("certainty generally is illusion
and repose is not the destiny of man").
74 Id at 478
(1897).
75 Holmes, The Class
of '61, in The EssentialHolmes at 94, 95 (cited in note 59). See also
Holmes, Natural Law at 44 (cited in note 35) ("Philosophy does not furnish motives but
it shows men that they are not fools for doing what they already want to do. It opens to
the forlorn hopes on which we throw ourselves away, the vista of the farthest stretch of
human thought, the chords of a harmony that breathes from the unknown."); Holmes,
Law in Scienceand Sciencein Law at 462-63 (cited in note 58) (". .. without ideals what
is life worth? They furnish us our perspectives and open glimpses of the infinite."); Letter
from Holmes to Wu (Sept 20, 1923) at 167 (cited in note 42) ("A man's spiritual history
is best told in what he does in his chosen line. Life having thrown me into the law, I must
try to put my feeling of the infinite into that, to exhibit the detail with such hint of a
vista as I can, to show in it the great line of the universal."); Holmes, The Pr.,fessionof the
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Elsewherehe noted how absolutistpatternsof thoughtnot only
stuntobservationandthwartspeculationbut alsoimpairaction.For
with evenhe associatedthe absolutist"demandfor the superlative"
tual disillusionment,and with the paralysis,disengagement,and
despairthat flows therefrom:
If a mansees no reasonfor believingthatsignificance,
consciousnessandidealsaremorethanmarksof the finite,that
doesnot justifywhathasbeenfamiliar
in Frenchsceptics;getto lookwithhaughtyscorn
tingupona pedestalandprofessing
upona worldin ruins. ... Whyshouldwe employtheenergy
whichis furnished
to us by the cosmosto defyit andshakeour
fist at the sky?It seems to me silly.76

To Holmes, the challengewe all confrontis to abandoncomforting
illusions and appreciatethe limits of human understanding,and
then live life to the fullestwith energy,wonder,dedication,andjoy
in the struggle.The duty and dignityof mundaneengagementwas
a theme that stirredhis imagination:
Whenit is saidthatwe aretoo muchoccupiedwiththemeans
of livingto live,I answerthatthe chiefworthof civilization
is
thatit calls
justthatit makesthemeansof livingmorecomplex;
for greatandcombinedintellectual
efforts,insteadof simple,
uncoordinated
ones,in orderthatthe crowdmaybe fed and
clothedandhousedandmovedfromplaceto place.Because
morecomplexandintenseintellectual
effortsmeana fullerand
richerlife. They meanmorelife. Life is an endin itself,and
the only questionas to whetherit is worthlivingis whether

you have enough of it.77

Law, in CollectedLegal Papers at 29-30 (cited in note 9) ("a man may live greatly in the
law as well as elsewhere . . there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in
an infinite perspective"); Holmes, Brown University-Commencement 1897, id at 165, 166
("I care not very much for the form if in some way [a man] has learned that he cannot
set himself over against the universe as a rival god, to criticize it, or to shake his fist at
the skies, but that his meaning is its meaning, his only worth is as a part of it, as a humble
instrument of the universal power ....
not merely a necessary but a willing instrument
in working out the inscrutable end."). For an interesting comparison of Holmes's observations concerning what he termed "the infinite" and "the cosmos" with those of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, whom Holmes emulated as a young man, see Catherine Wells Hantzis,
Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition:The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell
Holmes,Jr., 82 Nw U L Rev 541, 560-61 (1988).
76Id at 43.
77 Holmes, Speechto the Bar Associationof Boston,in CollectedLegal Papers at 244, 247-48
(cited in note 9). See also Letter from Holmes to Wu (March 26, 1925) at 178 (cited in
note 42), in which Holmes describes his "imaginary society of jobbists, who were free to
be egotists or altruists on the usual Saturday half holiday provided they were neither while
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Holmes was indeed a skepticby temperamentand self-training.
But he was not a cynic or nihilist or disengagedagnostic.78The
operationalskepticismthatis integralto the scientificmethodbears
little resemblanceto the skepticismof cynical withdrawal.That
difference is of the essence in trying to understandHolmes's
thought in general and his views about free speech in particular.
He did not treat ideas, his own or those of others, as trivialplaythings. To the contrary,he believed that forming and defending
strong opinions-not just self-servingpreferences-is the stuff of
life. He consideredthe freedom to do so "the principleof the
Constitutionthat more imperativelycalls for attachmentthan any
other."79

As is true of the lawof supplyanddemand,the rubricof nihilism
cannot elucidateHolmes's marketmetaphor.We might stop here
and conclude that for all his brilliance and eloquence Holmes
simplywas not a systematicthinker,howeverremarkablehe might
have been at producingthe felicitousaphorismor the penetrating
apercu.At the least we might concludethat he failed to articulate
a coherent argumenton the occasion of the Abramsdissent.My
project,however,is to look further,to see whether more can be
gleaned from his opinion than the inadequateexplanationsconsideredso far.
on the job. Their job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man is on
that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or his neighbors, and the
more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to solve." Emphasizing this existentialist dimension, Richard Posner has described Holmes as "the American Nietzsche." See
Richard Posner, The Problemsof Jurisprudence239-42 (1990); Posner, The EssentialHolmes
at xviii-xx, xxviii (cited in note 59). This characterization is defended at length in Brian
Leiter, Holmes, Economics,and ClassicalRealism, in Steven J. Burton, ed, The Path of the
Law and Its Influence 285-301 (2000). It is elaborated with important qualifications in
Luban, 44 Duke L J at 485-88 (cited in note 72). In an encomium to the late Chief Justice
of Massachusetts, Walbridge Abner Field, Holmes gave expression to a philosophy of
heroic engagement: "Our last word about the unfathomable universe must be in terms of
thought. If we believe that anything is, we must believe in that, because we can go no
further. We may accept its canons even while we admit that we do not know that we know
the truth of truth. Accepting them, we accept our destiny to work, to fight, to die for
ideal aims. At the grave of a hero who has done these things we end not with sorrow at
the inevitable loss, but with the contagion of his courage; and with a kind of desperate
joy we go back to the fight." See The EssentialHolmes at 213 (cited in note 59).
78
The locusclassicusof the argument that "[t]o a remarkable degree Holmes simply did
not care" is Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,31 U Chi L Rev 213, 255 (1964). For a
convincing refutation that discerns very different implications from the central role that
skepticism played in Holmes's thought, see Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas
O'FallonMemorialLectureon Law andAmericanCulture:Holmes,Pragmatism,and Democracy,
71 Or L Rev 521 (1992).
79 United States v Schwimmer,279 US 644, 653
(1928) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
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III. EVOLUTION
Holmes never used the phrase "marketplaceof ideas." That
is a paraphrasesupplied by his interpreters.80The phrase he actually employed in the Abramsopinion, "competition of the market,"
may suggest a focus on neither the price- and output-determining,
utility-maximizing characteristics of markets nor their celebration
of discretionary choice, but rather on the harsh fact that economic
actors and their products are pitted against one another. This interpretation gains support from Holmes's particularaffinity for the
work of Malthus, who emphasized scarcity and challenged some of
the more ambitious claims of his fellow economists regarding inevitable market self-corrections.81Perhaps the keyword in Holmes's
phrase is not "market"but "competition." In this view, precisely
because "truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out,"82what is needed for ideas is a vibrant, brutal
weeding-out process analogous to the function markets for goods
and services perform in killing off inefficient enterprises and forcing
unproductive workers to be fired.83In an unsent letter to Herbert
Croly, composed in the year of his Abrams dissent, Holmes said:
"in the main I am for aeration of all effervescing convictions-there
is no way so quick for letting them get flat."84As he put it to John
Wu, one of his favorite correspondents in later life: "Every society
is founded on the death of men."85Every society is also founded,
he might have added, on the death of ideas.
80

The precise phrase "marketplace of ideas" was first employed in a Supreme Court
opinion in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Lamont v PostmasterGeneral, 381 US
301, 308 (1965). For a detailed survey of the Court's use of the phrase, see Haig Bosmajian,
Metaphorand Reasonin Judicial Opinions49-72 (1992). For the earliest uses of the phrase
in popular discussion, see note 41.
81
See text at note 13; Barber, History at 68-72 (cited in note 12); Stefan Collini, Donald
Winch, and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth Century
IntellectualHistory 80-81 (1983).
82

See text at notes 50-51.

The classic justification of economic elimination is Schumpeter's notion of "creative
destructive." See Joseph Schumpeter, The Theoryof EconomicDevelopment(1911). On the
analogy between selective survival in nature and in economic markets, compare Milton
Friedman, The Methodologyof Positive Economics,in Essays in Positive Economics3 (1953),
with Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, EvolutionaryTheorizingin Economics,16 J
Econ Perspectives 23 (2002).
84
See Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 12, 1919), in 1 Holmes-LaskiLetters at 204
(cited in note 13).
85 Letter from Holmes to Wu
(July 21, 1925), in Max Lerner, ed, The Mind and Faith
of Justice Holmes 427-28 (1943).
83
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Holmes was fascinatedby lethal force. As befits a soldier who
was seriouslywoundedat Ball'sBluff,Antietam,andyet againnear
his writingsaboundwith militarymetaphorsand
Fredericksburg,86
to
the
paeans
dignity of struggle.87The centralityof conflict and
contest is a recurrenttheme in his philosophicalmusings.88
Recall
his descriptionof life as a "roarof bargainand battle."89
Afterhis
brushes
with
and
the
on
a
scale
death
that
youthful
carnage
grand
he witnessed,it is no wonderthat the subjectof survivalengaged
his attention, or that he was intriguedby the discoveriesof his
fellowMalthusian,CharlesDarwin.90
Holmes consideredhimselfa
Darwinistand concentratedhis scholarlyenergieson the question
of how law evolves.91
When Holmes was attendingthe meetingsof
the MetaphysicalClub duringthe early 1870s, ChaunceyWright,
the group'sleaderwhom Holmes treatedas a mentor,92
was in the
midst of an extended,mutuallysupportivecorrespondencewith
Darwin.93
A possible difficultywith readinginto the marketmetaphora
86 See Liva
Baker, Justicefrom BeaconHill: The Life and Times of Oliver WendellHolmes
114-19, 131-36, 142-43. For an account of how Holmes's experience in the Civil War
had a profound influence on his thought, see Menand, MetaphysicalClub at 23-69 (cited
in note 57).
87
See, for example, Holmes, The Fraternity of Arms, in The EssentialHolmes at 73 (cited
in note 59); The Soldier'sFaith, id at 87.
88 See, for
example, Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Feb 1, 1920), in 2 Holmes-Pollock
Letters at 36 (cited in note 36) (". . . I do think that the sacredness of human life is a
purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force, mitigated
so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio, and between two groups that want
to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no remedy except force"); Letter from Holmes
to Einstein (Oct 12, 1914), in Holmes-EinsteinLetters at 100-01 (cited in note 14) ("I
suppose the war was inevitable . . . . it shows us that classes as well as nations that mean
to be in the saddle have got to be ready to kill to keep their seat; and that the notion that
all that remained for the civilized world was to sit still, converse, and be comfortable was
humbug.").
89 See text at note 75.
90
On Darwin's considerable intellectual debt to Malthus, see Jonathan Hodge, The
NotebookProgrammesand Projectsof Darwin's LondonYears,in The CambridgeCompanionto
Darwin 40, 60-61 (2003); Jonathan Howard, Darwin 14-15, 19 (1982); Ernst Mayr, One
Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought 75-79,
85-86 (1991).
91 See
J. W. Burrow, Holmes in His IntellectualMilieu, in Gordon, ed, The Legacyof Oliver
WendellHolmes,Jr. at 17 (cited in note 57); E. Donald Elliott, Holmesand Evolution:Legal
Processas Artificial Intelligence, 13 J Legal Stud 113 (1984); Wiener, Evolution at 172-89
(cited in note 56); Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmesand Evolution, 72 Cal L Rev
343 (1984).
92
See text at note 56; Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Aug 30, 1929), in 2 HolmesPollockLetters (cited in note 36).
93 See
Wiener, Evolution at 48-60 (cited in note 56).
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Darwinistconcern for intellectualadaptationis that Holmes was
struckby how resistantto change are the ideas that people hold
dear:"Onecannot be wrenchedfromthe rockycrevicesinto which
one has grownfor manyyearswithout feeling that one is attacked
Muchashe believedthattraditionalbeliefsregarding
in one'slife."94
populationand progresshad been disprovedby Malthus,Holmes
chafedat theirresilience:"Malthuspleasedme immensely-and left
me sad.A hundredyearsago he bustedfallaciesthatpoliticiansand
laborleadersstill live on. One thinksthat an errorexposedis dead,
but exposureamountsto nothing when people want to believe."95
Holmes may have welcomedthe death of ideas but, given his understandingof the psychologyof belief formation,one wonders
how he could have consideredthe marketplaceof ideas to be the
Grim Reaperhe sought.
Actually,the theory of evolution might help to explainwhy a
robustfreedomof speechcanbe extremelyvaluableevenwhenmost
validrefindividualsremainstubbornlyimperviousto demonstrably
utationsof their beliefs.For the engine that drivesevolutionis not
change in the characteristicsof individualcreaturesbut rather
changeover time in the makeupof populations.Naturalselection
causesthe creatureswith the most adaptivetraitsto predominate
and those with the least adaptivetraitsto recedewithin a population.96Appliedto the realm of ideas, this selection processcauses
new entrantsto a communitywho hold more adaptivebeliefs to
constitute over time a larger proportionof the population.The
newcomerswith the better-suitedideas arrivedue to generational
changeoverand immigration.As the populationchangeswith the
infusionof new personswith differentideas,the patternof beliefs
within the communitychanges, even if no single individualever
embracesa new idea or discardsan old one.
Natural Law at 40 (cited in note 35).
Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Aug 30, 1914), in 1 Holmes-PollockLetters at 219
(cited in note 36). See also Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec 26, 1917), in 1 HolmesLaski Letters at 122 (cited in note 13): ("When I read Malthus I thought he had ripped
the guts out of some humbugs-but they are as alive as ever today. Humbugs have no
guts-and live all the better without them.").
96
See Howard, Darwin at 22 (cited in note 90) ("It is meaningless to say that individuals
evolve: evolution is the change in the average constitution of a population of individuals
as the generations succeed one another."); Mayr, One Long Argument at 43-44 (cited in
note 90) ("Darwinian evolution is discontinuous because a new start is made in every
generation when a new set of individuals is produced. That evolution nevertheless appears
to be totally gradual is because it is populational and depends on sexual reproduction
among the members of the population.").
94 Holmes,
9
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For this dynamicto occur,however,it is essentialthat the newcomers not simply replicatethe preexistingpatternof beliefs. In
Darwinistterms,what is needed is variation.To providethat, the
newcomersmust have the capacityto exerciseindependentjudgment and to form opinions that drawupon experiencesdifferent
from those that producedthe earlier pattern of beliefs. Here is
where the freedom of speech comes in. A political regime that
discouragesand punishes free thought reduces the incidence of
variationin the realmof ideas,variationboth in the productionof
new ideas and in the embraceof previouslyunpopularideas.
An unregulatedmarketplaceof ideasencouragesfreethoughtnot
so muchby determiningthe equilibriumof the momentas by keeping low the barriersto entry,barriersthat take the form not only
of coercivesanctionsbut also social and intellectualpeer pressures
towardconformity.The sheerproliferationof ideasin a freemarket
complicatesperceptionsin a manner that helps to weaken such
barriers.In addition,the marketmetaphormakesa statementabout
the dynamicandchronicallyincompletecharacterof understanding
and the value of intellectualcontest and innovation.Such a statement by the constitutionalregime can help to legitimatedissent
and discreditdemandsfor orthodoxy,and in that way lend much
needed supportto newcomerswhose hereticalnotions will almost
alwaysengenderstrongresistancelacedwith accusationsof illegitimacyif not disloyalty.
This demographicaccountof intellectualevolutionassumesthat
individualsnever change their minds about questionsthat matter
to them.That, of course,is an exaggeration.Holmeswasimpressed
by how seldom and slowly people yield to telling criticism,but he
never maintainedthat such resistanceis for most personsabsolute.
When ideasceaseto work,whetheras guidesto conductor further
inquiry,theytendto be abandonedby the individualswhoseprojects
are frustratedas a result.The processtakestime andthe admission
of inefficacydoes not come easily for most believers.Much more
than rationalor empiricalrefutationin the abstractis required.
Usuallypressurebuildsup graduallybeforeit becomesunbearable.
But changesof mind do occur,if only rarely,for all but the most
refractoryzealots.Whether or not it is accurateto call Holmes a
pragmatist-a question that has produceda rich literature97-he
97 Compare Posner, The EssentialHolmes at 242-44 (cited in note 59); Wiener, Evolution
at 172-89 (cited in note 56); Morton White, Social Thoughtin America: The RevoltAgainst
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embracedthe pragmatisttenet thatideastend to flourishwhenthey
work and witherwhen they don't. His explicitand extravagantadmirationfor the writingsof John Dewey, though never explained
by Holmes in any detail, was very likely becauseof what Dewey
had to sayin supportof a pragmatistconceptionof justifiablebelief.
andNature,Dewey'smagnumopus elabHolmes saidof Experience
his
of
orating theory knowledge:
althoughDewey'sbookis incrediblyill written,it seemedto
to havea feelingof intimacywith
me afterseveralrereadings
theinsideof thecosmosthatI foundunequaled.
Some-thought
God wouldhavespokenhadHe beeninarticulate
butkeenly
desirousto tell you how it was.98

Formalism 59-75 (1947, 1957); Edward J. Bloustein, Holmes:His First AmendmentTheory
and His Pragmatist Bent, 40 Rutgers L Rev 283 (1988); M. H. Fisch, Justice Holmes, The
PredictionTheoryof Law, and Pragmatism, 39 J Philosophy 85 (1942); Grey, 41 Stan L Rev
(cited in note 18); Hantzis, 82 Nw U L Rev (cited in note 75); Luban, 44 Duke L J at
464 n 41 (cited in note 72); Note, Holmes, Peirce, and Legal Pragmatism, 84 Yale L J 1123,
with H. L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver WendellHolmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence163-64
(1984); Robert Gordon, Holmes's CommonLav as Legal and Social Science, 10 Hofstra L
Rev 719, 722-26 (1982); Hollinger, The Tough-MindedJusticeHolmes at 217-22 (cited in
note 57); Kelley, 14 SIU L J (cited in note 61).
Three arguments in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty,which as mentioned above Holmes
reread the same year he wrote the Abrams dissent, see text at note 63, lend support to
the effort to establish a link between Holmes and the pragmatists on the specific question
of how people change their minds. Mill had much more faith than Holmes in the power
of rational persuasion, but he did note in On Libertythat one of the advantages that truth
has over falsehood is that it can be continually rediscovered in different eras until eventually
conditions are ripe for its acceptance. Further signaling his recognition of how large a
part context plays in the process of belief formation, Mill claimed (implausibly) that all
the great advances in modern Western thought occurred in just three brief periods when
the society-wide level of intellectual ferment was extraordinary. And on the respective
roles of logic and experience, Mill said in On Liberty:"All languages and literatures are
full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in
it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the
meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them."
Mill, On Liberty at 97-98, 102-03, 110 (cited in note 38). It would be inaccurate to label
Mill a pragmatist and controversial to consider him a protopragmatist, but Mill's recognition of the importance of experience and context in how persons process ideas, articulated in a text well known to Holmes, is a further indication that Holmes did not
envision a marketplace of ideas in which the actors readily change their minds.
98Letter from Holmes to Pollock
(May 15, 1931), in 2 Holmes-PollockLetters at 287
(cited in note 36). See also Holmes's remark about Dewey in an earlier letter to Pollock:
"he is a bad writer and I found him very hard reading. Still his view of the universe came
home to me closer than any other I know." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (July 26,
1930), in id at 272. To Harold Laski Holmes wrote: "I am reading a book byJohn Dewey,
Few indeed are the books which hold so much of life with
Experienceand Nature ....
an even hand. If you asked me for a summary I couldn't give more than a page of ideas,
but the stimulus and the quasi-aesthetic enjoyment are great-and the tendencies those
which I agree with." Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec 4, 1926), in 2 Holmes-LaskiLetters
at 900 (cited in note 13). In a subsequent letter to Laski, Holmes continued to rave about
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The Darwinist/pragmatist
strainin Holmes'sthoughthelpsto explainhow he couldhavevaluedthe freedomof speechhighly,at least
by the time of theAbramsdissentandthereafter,9whilenevertheless
basisin that
holding that "beliefsand wisheshave a transcendental
theirfoundationis arbitrary.
Youcannot helpentertainingandfeeling
driven
them, and thereis an end of it."'00Neither demographically
in
the
of
beliefs
nor
the
of
abandonment
ideas
that
changes
pattern
arenot workingwill occurif peopledo not taketheirbeliefsseriously.
Casualattitudesabout belief formationand retentioninvite conformity,the pathof leastresistance.Improperlyunderstood,the First
Amendmentitself can contributeto such dysfunctionalconformity.
Deprivedby the freedomof speechof the comfortsof certitudeand
centralizedintellectualauthority,peoplemaybe temptedto taketheir
beliefslightly.The marketmetaphoroffersan antidoteto this temptation:a powerfulimage that treatsbeliefsas significant,even selfdefining,and of the highestsocialpriority,all the while being contingent,probabilistic,and tentative.As expoundedby Holmes, the
marketin ideasis not aboutintellectualgratificationandwhimsy.It
is aboutimportantchoiceswithpracticalconsequencesunderdifficult
conditionsof uncertaintyand change.The truthsthat peoplecome
to by freetradein ideasare,remember,"theonlygrounduponwhich
their wishessafelycan be carriedout."'01Conformity,deferenceto
authority,stasis,passivityin the realmof beliefsis not justunfortunate
or unwisebut dangerous.
The constructive,urgent role that speech can play in the evolution of beliefs under a pragmatistconceptionof truth insulates
he seems to me . . . more honestly to
Experienceand Nature: "truly a great book ....
see behind all the current philosophers than any book I can think of on such themes."
Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec 15, 1926), in id at 904-05. See also Holmes's extravagant
praise for Experienceand Nature in a letter to John C. H. Wu, the friend who originally
suggested to Holmes that he read the book: "I thought it great. It seemed to me to feel
the universe more inwardly and profoundly than any book I know, at least any book of
philosophy." Letter from Holmes to Wu (Jan 30, 1928), in Shriver, ed, Justice Oliver
WendellHolmes at 193 (cited in note 42).
99 On whether Holmes
changed his views in the direction of valuing free speech more
highly on the occasion of the Abrams dissent, compare H. L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver
WendellHolmes: Free Speechand the Living Constitution(1991), Sheldon M. Novick, The
Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 Supreme Court Review 303, 353-61,
and David S. Bogen, The Free SpeechMetamorphosisof Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 Hofstra L
Rev 97 (1982) (no change), with David M. Rabban, Free Speechin Its ForgottenYears346-55
(1997), Geoffrey R. Stone, PerilousTimes:Free Speechin Wartime198-211 (2004) ("Perilous
Times"),and G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernizationof Free SpeechJurisprudence:The Human Dimension, 80 Cal L Rev 391 (1992) (change).
100
Holmes, Natural Law at 41 (cited in note 35).
101
See text at note 51.
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Holmes's marketmetaphorfrom some of the standardcriticisms
to which it is subjected.The value of free tradein ideas does not
depend on the assumptionthat there is an objective,perdurable
truth to be discovered.102
It does not depend on the claim that
beliefs
are
more
or
less independentof the believer'ssocial
personal
position, psychologicalpropensitiesand needs, adventitiousexpeThose assumptionsmightbe
riences,andideologicalinheritance.'03
in
a
market
that
a finely calibratedmeaevoked
implicit
metaphor
surementof the equilibriumof well-groundedrationalbeliefs.They
are not implicitin Holmes's Darwinistinvocationof "the compe-

tition of the market."
Markets move quickly;evolution takes forever.Many of the pragmatists, Dewey most prominently, were reformers who sought to
remake various social institutions and practices in a fundamental
way and without delay.104
They may have been inspired by Darwin,
but the pace of change that one associates with biological or geological evolution was not what inspired them. If the value of a free
market in ideas lies in its contribution to the evolution of adaptive
beliefs, at what pace are those beliefs supposed to evolve? And does
the legal immunizing of speech that is perceived by governing majorities to be subversive of political or moral authority yield the
optimal rate of change? What did Holmes think about the relationship between free speech and the rate of social change?
One of Holmes's guiding convictions was that the dominant forces
in the society are entitled to have their way. He took the point of
political institutions to be to enable the majority to implement its
(arbitrary)preferences, "the kind of world that we should like."'05
He expressednone of the concern about the tyrannyof the majority
that informs the political thought of Madison, Tocqueville, and
Mill.106Louis Menand well captures this dimension of his thought:
102

CompareBaker,HumanLibertyat 6, 12-14 (cited in note 20); StanleyIngber,The
Marketplace
of Ideas:A LegitimizingMyth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 15 (1984).
103
Compare,Baker,id at 6-7, 14-17; Ingber,id at 15;JonathanWeinberg,Broadcasting
and Speech,81 Cal L Rev 1101, 1157-62 (1993).
104
See generallyJames T. Kloppenberg,UncertainVictory:SocialDemocracy
and ProandAmericanThought1870-1920 349-94 (1986);RobertB. Westgressivismin European
brook,JohnDeweyandAmericanDemocracy
(1991).
105Holmes, NaturalLaw at 41 (cited in note 35).
106
Holmes was no absolutiston the subjectof majorityrule:he saw
Characteristically,
a role for minorityrights. But he did not fear majoritiesthe way manyleadingpolitical
thinkershave. His dissent in Lochnerv New York,198 US 45, 76 (1905), expresseshis
enthusiasmfor majorityrule:"Everyopiniontendsto becomea law.I thinkthatthe word
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The key to Holmes'scivil libertiesopinionsis the key to all his
it is that he thought only in termsof aggregate
jurisprudence:
socialforces;he hadno concernforthe individual.The spectacle
of individualsfallingvictim to dominantpoliticalor economic
tendencies,when those tendencieshadbeen instantiatedin duly
enactedlaws, gave him a kind of chilly satisfaction.It struck
him as analogousto the deathof soldiersin a battlefieldvictory,
and justifiedon the samegrounds-that for the groupto move
ahead,some people must inevitablyfall by the wayside.107
Unlike many of his privileged contemporaries, however, Holmes
did not believe that the dominant forces have any moral claim to
maintain their dominance. He thought that change is both inevitable and endurable. He never spelled out a theory of legitimate
change-it would have been against his very nature to have done
so-but his approach to constitutional interpretation depended on
an attitude, if not a theory, about change.
Holmes's general approach to constitutional interpretation was
to defer to legislative judgments. He was skeptical, at times even
contemptuous, of much of the progressive era legislation that was
challenged in the Supreme Court during his tenure, but he was
loathe to hold that legislation unconstitutional.108He believed that
when the dominant forces in the community were (regrettably)
bitten by the bug of progressive reform, that preference had to be
permitted to prevail. The previously dominant forces of laissezfaire capitalism were not entitled, in Holmes's view, to preserve
their power indefinitely against the rise of the emergent forces of
progressivism. Dominant forces emerge and recede. "Time has upset many fighting faiths."109
Disputes over the freedom of speech raise an interesting question
for someone who respects the claims of force.10 On the one hand,
legislation restricting speech, especially speech that challenges exliberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."
107
Menand, MetaphysicalClub at 65-66 (cited in note 57).
108
See, for example, Lochnerv New York,198 US 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J, dissenting);
Coppagev Kansas, 236 US 1, 26 (1915) (Holmes, J, dissenting); Adair v United States, 208
US 161, 190 (1908) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
09Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
110See Frederick
Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 Cal L
Rev 761 (1986).
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isting social and politicalarrangements,can be seen as justanother
exampleof the dominantforcesin the communityhavingtheirway.
In this view,one prerogativeof politicalascendancyis the authority
to controlthe termsof debate.On the otherhand,one mightargue
that, at least in a democracy,the dominantforces are entitled to
prevailonly if they are ableto maintaintheirdominancein the face
of open challengesto theirauthority.Politicalarrangements
should
reflect the ascendancyof forces, but new forces must have some
opportunityto emerge and eventuallygain ascendancy.
I may be guilty here of tryingto imposeon Holmes'sthoughta
conceptionof procedurallegitimacythat is entirelyaliento his way
of thinking.He was a Darwinist,he did believein change,and he
viewedsocietyin termsof forces,but he simplydidnot like to think
about political issues in terms of so morally tinged a notion as
legitimacy.Still, a judgehas to decidecases,and it is impossibleto
do that, I would argue,withoutrepairingin some way to a view of
legitimacy.In any event, there is reasonto believethat Holmes at
first thought that free speech cases are constitutionallysimilarto
economicregulationcasesin thatlegislaturesshouldbe givenbroad
authorityto implement their preferredpolicies. At least on the
occasionof Abrams,and arguablyeight months earlier,"'Holmes
seems to have shiftedto the view that the dominantforces of the
communitydo not havebroadpowerto determinewhichchallenges
to their authorityshall be heard.
There is no premiseor metricinternalto the theoryof evolution
that can determinethe answerto this fundamentalquestionof how
much the dominantforcesare entitledto mobilizethe resourcesof
law to extendtheir dominanceby slowingthe pace or alteringthe
directionof inevitablechange.Even in a regimethat repressesdis"' Schenckv United States, 249 US 47 (1919); Frohwerk in United States, 249 US 204
(1919); Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919). These are decisions, with Holmes writing
for a unanimous court, that upheld criminal convictions of various socialists for antiwar
polemics that today clearly would qualify for First Amendment protection. Nevertheless,
by employing the "clear-and-present-danger" test and by declining to suspend it even
"[w]hen a nation is at war," Schenck, 249 US at 52, Holmes can be read to evince an
appreciation of the value of political criticism. By insisting that First Amendment protection remains "a question of proximity and degree," not a matter of the innate
tendency
of the idea, Holmes implemented an approach that was, in theory at least, more protective
of controversial speakers than the "bad tendency" test that previously had dominated First
Amendment interpretation and that was being urged in many quarters as a justification
for the widespread prosecution of war protestors. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The
Origins of
the "BadTendency"Test:Free Speechin Wartime,2002 Supreme Court Review 411, 446-47.
On the bad tendency test generally, see Rabban, Free Speechin Its ForgottenYearsat 132-46
(cited in note 99).
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sent systematicallyandwithoutconstitutionalconstraint,the forces
of nascentdisplacementstill canoperateunderground,andstillhave
meansfor bringingaboutchangerangingfrom anonymousprotest
to peacefulcivil disobedienceto violent revolution.Is that enough
to effectuatethe evolutionaryprocess?To decide,one needs more
than an understandingof variation,adaptation,and naturalselection. One needs a politicalor constitutionaltheory,or a readingof
history.
IV.

SEDITION

Holmesrealizedthis.Recallthe passageof hisAbramsdissent
quoted earlier:
I wholly disagreewith the argumentof the Governmentthat
the FirstAmendmentleft the commonlaw as to seditiouslibel
in force.Historyseemsto me againstthe notion.I hadconceived
that the United States throughmanyyears had shown its repentancefor the SeditionAct of 1798, by repayingfinesthatit
imposed.112

This allusion to the nation's ill-fated effort during its fledgling years
to enforce a political orthodoxy13 has not received the attention it
deserves.14The passage is not just boilerplate rhetoric; it is integral
to Holmes's argument. The Espionage Act of 1918, the federal
statute that the defendants in the case were charged with violating,
was really a sedition act. It prohibited ideological disloyalty as much

112

250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
See generally Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Caseand the FirstAmendment
56-66 (1991); James Morton Smith, Freedom'sFetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and
American Civil Liberties(1956); Stone, Perilous Times at 16-78 (cited in note 99).
114
A notable exception is Robert Post, ReconcilingTheoryand Doctrinein FirstAmendment
Jurisprudence,in Bollinger and Stone, eds, Eternally Vigilant at 156-61 (cited in note 30).
Post marks Holmes's reference to the rejection of seditious libel as "the precise point in
American constitutional history when First Amendment theory enters into the construction
of First Amendment doctrine, for Holmes's bold assertion required him to explain why
the First Amendment prohibited the punishment of seditious libel." Id at 156-57. Post
concludes, however, that although Holmes was prompted by the issue of the constitutional
status of seditious libel to develop a First Amendment theory, he "chose not to elaborate
a political conception of the First Amendment" but rather "proposed the now-famous
theory of the marketplace of ideas." Id at 157. My claim, to be elaborated below, is that
Holmes's market metaphor does indeed embody "a political conception of the First
Amendment."
113
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The government
as materialinterferencewith the war effort.115
lawyersin the Abramsappealdid not shrinkfrom this characterization but ratherembracedit.116Their brief, written by Assistant
AttorneyGeneralRobertStewart,maintainedthatthe FirstAmendment was nevermeantto invalidatethe old crimeof seditiouslibel.
Rather,the power to punish sedition remaineda prerogativeof
The legitimateobjective
sovereigntyevenin the novusordoseclorum.
of the crime of seditiouslibel, so the brief claimed,was to control
hostile criticismin order to protect the government'sreputation
and therebypreservepolitical stability,a fragile condition in the
seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies,the heydayof seditious-libel
prosecutions.A modernequivalentlike the EspionageAct of 1918,
in this view, was not constitutionallyproblematic,particularlyin
light of the need to preservepoliticalstabilityin time of war.117
Stewartmay have been goadedinto makingthis provocativeargumentby a brieffiled earlierthatyearin the case of Debsv United
Statesby the noted civil libertieslawyerGilbertRoe.118
That brief
had arguedthat the very purposeof the First Amendmentis to
protectfundamentalpoliticalcriticismof the sort historicallypunished as seditiouslibel. To sustainthat contention,Roe constructed
his brief aroundJamesMadison'sVirginiaReport,the classicchallenge to the SeditionAct of 1798 by the principalauthorof the
FirstAmendment.119
In Madison'sview,the distinctive"genius"of
the Americanrepublic,based on the concepts of limited government, divided powers, and popularsovereignty,not to mention
revolutionaryheritage, is a dynamic of political opposition, ac115 The Abrams defendants were convicted on four counts of
violating the Espionage
Act of 1918. Two of those counts clearly sound in sedition: (1) publishing "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the United States"; and (2)
publishing language "intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into
contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute." See Abramsv United States, 250 US 616, 617
(1919). The convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court on the other two counts,
for language encouraging resistance and curtailment of production. Id. The majority did
not reach the issue of whether conviction on the first two counts standing alone would
have violated the First Amendment.
116
Brief of the United States in Abrams v United States, 250 US 616 (1919) (No 316),
36.
See Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and
p
Free Speech232-33 (1987).
117Id at 19-21, 25.
118 Brief of Gilbert E. Roe as Amicus Curiae in Debs v United
States, 249 US 211 (1919)
(No 714), pp 32-42.

"9James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (1800) ("Report"),in Jack N.
Rakove, ed, James Madison: Writings 608-62 (Library of America, 1999).
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countability,and checksandbalancesthatmakesinapplicablemany
English politicalnotions, includingthat of seditiouslibel.120
At the time of the Court'sdecisionin Debs,Roe was unableto
persuadeHolmes to adopt this Madisonianunderstandingof the
FirstAmendment;in fact, Holmes wrote the majorityopinionthat
upheldDebs'sconviction.'2Butin theAbramsdissenteightmonths
later,Holmes sawfit to stateexplicitlyhis conclusionthat,whatever
else the freedomof speechmeansin the Americancontext,it means
that dissenterscannot be punishedfor underminingthe authority
of governmentby disseminatingseditiousideas.122
Evenhis rhetoric
in Abramshas a Madisonianring: "we should be eternallyvigilant
againstattemptsto checkthe expressionof opinionsthatwe loathe
and believeto be fraughtwith death.. . ."123 In decidingwhether,
in a system committedto politicalevolution,the dominantforces
mayemploythe authorityof lawto stifleor weakendissent,Holmes
turnedto one of the premierobjectlessonsof the nation'shistory
andto the conceptof legitimatepoliticaloppositionthatit spawned.
To appreciatethe significanceof this move, one mustrealizehow
controversialit was in Holmes's day.Many personswho conceded
the valueof dissentstoppedshortat the notion thata constitutional
principlesuchas the freedomof speechcouldbe invokedby persons
who advocatethe use of force or violence to effectuatea fundamentalchangeof politicalregime.'24In this view,the Constitution
120Id at 329-31.
121 Debs v United
States, 249 US 211 (1919).
122
123

250 US at 630.

Id.

124
See, for example, John H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedomof Speechand Freedom
of Thuggeryin War-Timeand Peace-Time, 14 U Ill L Rev 539, 559-60 (1920):

The truth is that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech is being
invoked more and more in misuse. It represents the unfair protection much
desired by impatient and fanatical minorities-fanatically committed to some new
revolutionary belief, and impatient of the usual process of rationally converting
the majority. . .. Certain leaders of thought-some idealists, some materialistssee only red when their own particular doctrines are balked of immediate general
acceptance. Impatient of that "free trade in ideas" which the Minority Opinion
assures us will exhibit ultimately the "power of the thought to get itself accepted,"
these fanatical leaders invoke club-law. They call for "direct action" (this cowardly
euphemism for brutal mob violence must now be familiar to all readers of recent
periodical literature). And when their urgent propaganda of club-law meets lawful
interference, they invoke the sacred constitutional guarantee of "freedom of
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providesfor changebut only by the prescribedmethodof peaceful
protest directedtowardeventualsuccessat the polls; radicalsunwilling to play by those rules shouldnot be permittedto claimthe
benefit of the very freedomsthey seek to displace.This position
was not the exclusivepreserveof reactionaries.EvenLearnedHand
drew the line at the explicitadvocacyof law violation:
a lawmeansthatit shallbe
Everysocietywhichpromulgates
obeyeduntilit is changed,andanysocietywhichlaysdown
meansby whichits lawscan be changedmakesthosemeans
to
exclusive. . . . If so, howin God'snamecananincitement
do whatwillbe unlawfulif done,be itselflawful?125
Holmes, in contrast,did not believethatthe Constitutionshould
be readto lock in place an absoluteproceduraltruthregardingthe
exclusivemeansfor effectuatingpoliticalchange.InAbramshe voted
to protect the speech of anarchistswho had called for a general
strike,nevereven consideringwhetherthat tacticwas forbiddenby
law.126Six years later, in Gitlow v New York,127Holmes argued in

dissentthatthe explicitadvocacyof "revolutionary
massaction"was
entitled to First Amendmentprotectionin the particularcircumstancesof the case. On that occasion,he made even more explicit
his Darwinistunderstandingof the dynamicsof politicalchange,
adopting the very position that LearnedHand consideredincoherent.
Hand'sview,most fully elaboratedin his greatopinionin Masses
was that underdemocratictheoryincitePublishingCo.v Patten,'28
ments to law violation fall outside the ambit of the freedom of
speech as a matterof principle,irrespectiveof whetherthe context
indicatesan imminentdangerof illegalconductby personsexposed
to the speech. Hand held that view becausehe consideredincitements to law violationnot to be amongthe "exclusive"meanslaid
down by a democraticsociety "bywhich its laws can be changed."
speech." It is simply a profanation of that term.
For a retrieval and defense of this view in the modern era, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some Modern First AmendmentProblems,47 Ind L J 1, 31 (1971).
125
Letter from Learned Hand to Elliot Richardson (Feb 29, 1952), quoted in Gerald
Gunther, LearnedHand: The Man and the Judge (1994).
126
250 US at 630.
127
268 US 652 (1925) (Holmes, J, dissenting).
128 235 F 535
(SDNY 1917), rev'd 246 F 24 (2d Cir 1917).
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"Words,"he explained,"whichhave no purportbut to counselthe
violation of law cannot by any latitudeof interpretationbe a part
of that public opinion which is the final source of governmentin
On the otherhand,"politicalagitationwhich
a democraticstate.""29
can be shown to be apt to createa seditioustemper"is indeed,so
long as it falls short of the direct advocacyof law violation,a part
of "thatpublic opinion which is the final source of government,"
and as such deservesprotection as among the proper means by
which the laws of a democraticsociety can be changed.'30Thus
Hand, possibly influencedby anotherMadisonianbrief filed by
GilbertRoe,'31rejectedthe legitimacyof the crimeof seditiouslibel.
Notwithstandingthatjudgment-itself animportantmomentin the
history of thought about the freedom of speech-Hand believed
that incitementto law violationcan be prohibited;he did not consider the punishmentof such incitementto be precludedby the
rejectionof seditiouslibel.
Holmes declinedto follow Hand in this last respect.While joining his friendin findingthe crime of seditiouslibel to be incompatiblewith the FirstAmendment,Holmessawno reasonto exclude
incitementto law violation from the protectionof his imminent
dangerstandard,no reasonto excludethe explicitandimpassioned
advocacyof lawbreakingfromthe meansby whichpoliticalchange
may be broughtaboutso long as the likely or intendedeffectsare
He put the point memorably,with pragmatistresnot imminent.'32
in
onance, Gitlow:
129Id at 540.
130Id.
131
Gilbert Roe was the counsel of record for the magazine in Masses Publishing Co. v
Patten. See 244 Fed 535, 537 (1917). I have not been able to locate the papers he submitted
to Judge Hand in the District Court. It is possible, in light of Hand's reference in his
Masses opinion to the illegitimacy of prohibiting speech on the ground that it is likely to
create a seditious temper, that in arguing the case before Judge Hand Roe invoked Madison's Virginia Reportin much the way he did twenty months later in the amicus brief he
filed in the Debs case. See text accompanying notes 118-20. Such a speculation gains
support from the fact that not long before he tried the Masses case in Judge Hand's
courtroom, Roe testified against the Espionage Act to the House Committee on the
Judiciary. See Hearings Before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
65th Cong, 1st Sess, Hearings on HR 291 at 36-43 (Apr 9 and 12, 1917). On that occasion
as well, Roe discussed the controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798. See Geoffrey R.
Stone, Judge LearnedHand and the EspionageAct of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U Chi
L Rev 335, 351 (2003).
132
In the Abrams dissent, Holmes stated that a person can be punished for speech "that
produces or is intendedto producea clear and imminent danger." 250 US at 627 (emphasis
added). A page later, he repeated his belief that a speaker's intent to create an imminent
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Every idea is an incitement.It offers itself for belief and if
believedit is acted on unlesssome other belief outweighsit or
some failureof energy stifles the movementat its birth.The
only differencebetween the expressionof an opinion and an
incitementin the narrowsense is the speaker'senthusiasmfor
the result.Eloquencemay set fire to reason.133
As if to underscore his differences with Hand regarding the sources
and limits of political authority, Holmes added:
If in the long runthe beliefsexpressedin proletariandictatorship
are destinedto be acceptedby the dominantforcesof the community,the only meaningof free speechis that they shouldbe
given their chanceand have their way.'34
Hand understood the rejection of seditious libel to entail a rejection of the power of the state to enforce any kind of orthodoxy
of acceptable political ends; he was the first judge to interpret the
freedom of speech to imply a strong principle of substantive viewpoint neutrality.'35In doing so, he anticipated an idea that has
come to be the cornerstone of modern First Amendment docdangercan justifyregulationeven of speech that appearsunder the circumstancesto be
unlikelyto havethateffect.This is becausesuchan intent"mightindicatea greaterdanger
and at any ratewouldhavethe qualityof an attempt."Id at 628. In Gitlow,Holmesvoted
to protecta defendantwho had engagedin abstractadvocacyof revolution.He specified,
however,that if the speakerhad been convictedof "an attemptto induce an uprising
againstgovernmentat once andnot at some indefinitetime in the future,"thenthe "object
would have been one with which the law might deal, subjectto the doubt . . whether
[the speech]was not futile and too remotefrom possibleconsequences."268 US at 673.
This last caveatindicatesHolmes'srecognitionof a futilitydefense,whichhe hadseemed
to rejectin Abrams.
The important point is that Holmes's willingness to punish speakers on the basis of
their specific intentions as well as the likely effects of their speech extended only to the
intention to create imminent harm. He did not embrace a content-based, context-independent conception of illegitimate speech akin to Learned Hand's view that the advocacy
of law violation is, as a matter of democratic principle, outside the ambit of First Amendment protection. Holmes understood the rejection of seditious libel to mean that a critic
of government must be free, whatever his long-term objectives, to say that a law should
be violated or a regime overthrown by force, so long as the requisite connection to
imminent consequences has not been established. Hand did not agree.
133268 US at 673.
134Id.
135

See Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan 8, 1920), in Gerald
Gunther, LearnedHand and the Originsof ModernFirst AmendmentDoctrine:SomeFragments
of History, 27 Stan L Rev 719, 765 (1975) ("any State which professes to be controlled by
public opinion, cannot take sides against any opinion except that which must express itself
in the violation of law.").
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trine.'36Holmes went further.In addition to the rejection of an
orthodoxyof ends, he took the rejectionof seditiouslibel to entail
the rejectionof an orthodoxyof means,specificallythe orthodoxy
establishingdemocraticdeliberationas the exclusivemeansof political change. Both judges knew, of course, that violence or the
threatthereofhas throughouthistoryplayeda largerole in bringing aboutpoliticalchange,salutaryandnefarious,in constitutional
democraciesas well as in other systems.Bothjudgeshadno qualms
about punishing dissidents who themselves engage in violence.
The differencebetween them, I believe, is that Holmes, the old
soldier and proud Darwinist, thought that one of the valuable
functions of dissenting speech, including speech that advocates
violent revolution,is its capacityto generate some of the grievances,aspirations,andmobilizationsthatforcepoliticaladaptation
and transformation.Such energiesare activatedand sustainednot
only by respectful petition and rational persuasionbut also by
incitement, recruitment,and organizationfor collective action.
Probablythe most energizing contributionthat the freedom of
speech can make is simply to leave people free to follow their
politicalthoughtswhereverthey might lead-free, thatis, to think
the unthinkableregardingpolitical loyalty, consent, obedience,
and violence. That no viable political communitycould possibly
recognize a comparablefreedom to act does not, in this view,
render incoherent or dysfunctionala capaciousfreedom to disseminate heretical political ideas, including ideas about the appropriatemeans for bringing about change.
To understandHolmes on this point, one must appreciatehow
farhe was from a modernproceduralliberalconcernedmoreabout
the right than the good, and thus how wrong it is to try to turn
his marketplaceof ideas into a systematicprocessto be evaluated
according to standardsof fairness, neutrality,and efficiency.137
Holmes consistentlytalkedaboutdissentingspeechin termsof the
not the qualityof decisions
energiesit releasesor failsto release,'38
or opportunitiesforparticipationthatit makespossible.Understood
136 See
generally Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulationand the First Amendment,25 Wm
& Mary L Rev 189 (1983); Susan H. Williams, ContentDiscriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U Pa L Rev 615 (1991).
137For an otherwise
interesting critique of the market metaphor that founders by making
this mistake, see Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism,Progressivism,and the First
Amendment, 64 U Colo L Rev 1061, 1071-73 (1993).
138See text at notes
84 and 133.

40

THESUPREMECOURTREVIEW

[2004

in these Darwinist/pragmatist
terms,such speechachievesits effect
mainly by influencingthe culture of political struggle.This can
happenwhen the visibilityof dissentingideas,madepossiblein part
by legal protection,emboldenspersonsin the minorityto hold out
hope for change,to fightbackwhenridiculed,exploited,or ignored,
perhapsto find confederatesin the project of resistance.It can
happenwhen personswho hold views currentlyin the ascendancy
find it more difficult,due to the constitutionallysanctionedlegitimacyof seditiousspeech,to dismissprotestorsas beneathpolitical
recognition,in effectbeyondthe pale.It canhappenwhenthe sheer
pluralityof perspectivesin playforcesall actorsto "realizethattime
hasupsetmanyfightingfaiths"andthatone's"preferences
dogmatic
for oneself"grewout of uniqueexperiencessuchthat"others,poor
souls, may be equallydogmaticaboutsomethingelse."139
The cultural/intellectual/politicalcombat facilitated by free
speechis, in Holmes'svision,messy,unpredictable,often nasty,and
impossibleto domesticate.But it is what human flourishingin a
competitive,evolvingworldis all about.A letterthatHolmeswrote
to LearnedHand the yearbeforehisAbramsdissentbest articulates
the view of life that led Holmes to see value in the speech of dissenterswho refuseto play by the rules:
Youtempt me to repeatan apologuethat I got off to my wife
in front of the statueof Garrisonon CommonwealthAvenue,
Boston, many years ago. I said-If I were an officialpersonI
shouldsay nothing shallinduceme to do honor to a manwho
broke the fundamentalconditionof social life by biddingthe
verystructureof societyperishratherthanhe not havehiswayExpressedin termsof morals,to be sure,but still, his way.If I
were a son of GarrisonI should reply--Fool, not to see that
everygreatreformhas seemedto threatenthe structureof society,-but thatsocietyhasnot perished,becausemanis a social
animal,and with every turn falls into a new patternlike the
Kaleidoscope.If I were a philosopherI shouldsay-Fools both,
not to see thatyou arethe two blades(conservativeandradical)
of the shearsthat cut out the future.But if I were the ironical
man in the backof the philosopher'sheadI shouldconcludeGreatestfool of all, Thou-not to see that man'sdestinyis to
fight. Thereforetake thy place on the one side or the other,if
with the addedgraceof knowingthat the Enemy is as good a
139

Holmes, Natural Law at 41 (cited in note 35).
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man as thou, so much the better,but kill him if thou canst.14
When Holmes was required by his office shortly thereafter to determine what legal tools should be available for "killing"a political
enemy "as good a man as thou," he gave no weight to whether the
enemy was observing the prescribed procedures for cutting out the
future.
Why prefer Holmes's more radical,more cultural,less procedural
interpretation of the meaning of the rejection of seditious libel?
The market metaphor suggests some reasons. Markets are notable
for their decentralization of authority. Consumers rather than producers or planners are sovereign in that their choices ultimately
determine the allocation of economic resources. The placement of
authority anywhere else runs the risk of discouraging productive
adaptation and innovation, and providing opportunities for inefficient corruption and the wasteful perpetuation of privilege. A conception of political sovereignty that denies to officials the legal
power to enforce an ideological orthodoxy of either ends or means
likewise is characterizedby relatively decentralized authority.Under
that constraint on officials, political subjects are given the authority
to contemplate and advocate arrangements and practices that have
the potential to undermine the projects, and sometimes even the
very existence, of the prevailing regime. The energies latent in such
an allocation of authority reduce certain risks of political ossification
and abuse. In his VirginiaReportchallenging the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act of 1798, Madison derived his case for the right
to express seditious criticism of officials, even to the extent of undermining their authority by stirring up hatred against them, from
the premise that "[t]he people, not the government, possess the
absolute sovereignty."'14Those sovereign private citizens, whose
authority extends to creating and replacing particular regimes,142
140
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther,
27 Stan L Rev at 756-57 (cited in note 135).

Madison, Reportat 645 (cited in note 119).
Madison noted in the Virginia Reportthat had all seditious speech been successfully
censored during the years leading up to the founding of the current regime, "might not
the United States have been languishing, at this day, under the infirmities of a sickly
Confederation? Might they not, possibly, be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign
yoke?" Id at 647-48. In an opinion that Holmes joined, Justice Brandeis invoked the
nation's revolutionary heritage in developing his argument for the First Amendment right
to advocate the overthrow of an entire regime: "Those who won our independence by
revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change." Whitney v California,
274 US 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J, concurring).
141

142
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canbe analogizedto the sovereignconsumersin a market.Pressures
from below stimulateadaptationand help to containcorruptionin
both the politicaland economicrealms.
An egalitarianmight be tempted to run with this logic to the
extentof findingin the marketmetaphorsupportfor a FirstAmendment ideal of equalopportunityto persuade(or incite or organize
collectivepressure).I doubt that the sovereigntyenjoyedby consumersas a whole in most marketsimplies any such principleof
equalworthof individuals.Marketsareegalitarianin thata pauper's
dollar buys as much as a prince'sand the division of labor that
but inegalitarian
marketsmakepossiblecan spreadopportunity,143
in that marketsgreatlyfacilitatethe leveragingof (unequallydistributed)wealth and economic savvy.Perhapsan economic cooperativewould be a stronger (though still problematic)source of
analogicalsupport for a conception of political equality.In any
event, we can be confidentthat Holmes had no such egalitarian
implicationin mindwhenhe invokedthe competitionof the market
in his Abramsdissent.He once infamouslydismissedan equalprotection contentionas "the usual last resort of constitutionalarguments."144
Throughout his career on the Supreme Court, "he
treated the Equal Protection Clause as having virtuallyno effect."145

What Holmes liked aboutmarketsso far as the role of consumers
is concernedis not the way purchasingpoweris distributedamong
them, but ratherthe powerthat consumersexerciseas a collective
force that induces producersto adapt and innovate.The proper
analogyis to the power that sovereignpoliticalsubjectsin combination can exert in holding officials,and even entire regimes,
roughlyaccountableover time throughthe threatof disaffection,
noncooperation,and resistance.
This focus on the role of force as the arbiterof politicalpower
means that the freedom of speech implied by a reliance on the
marketmetaphoris not confinedto settingswhere the social prerequisitesfor meaningfulpersuasionandparticipationareoperative.
Accordingly,neitherthe town meetingnor the philosophyseminar
shouldbe seen as the prototypicalfreespeechsituation.In thisview,
the First Amendmentis primarilyabout the location of political
143For an
illuminating account of the often-overlooked egalitarian dimensions of Adam
Smith's thought, see Samuel Fleischaker, On Adam Smith's Wealthof Nations 72-80 (2004).
144 Buck v Bell, 274 US 200, 208
(1927).
145

G. Edward White, Justice Oliver WendellHolmes:Law and the Inner Self 348 (1993).
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authority,andmorebroadlyaboutthe culturalconditionsthatfoster
political accountabilityand adaptation.Deliberationamong relatively open-mindedpersons plays a role in such matters,but far
moreis entailedby this understandingof the functionof freespeech
than an exclusiveconcern for rationalinquiryand debate. Communicativeexperiencesthatareimportantmainlyin promotingsolidarityamong like-mindedpersons,or in helping individualsand
groupsto markout a distinctiveidentity,might qualifyas having
FirstAmendmentsalienceeven if "persuasion"
in the narrowsense
is not what those experiencesare about.'46That the marketmetaphorimpliesthe extensionof FirstAmendmentconcernto some
such activitiesleavesunresolvedall sorts of difficultquestionsre-

garding the proper scope of the principle of freedom of speech.'47

It is important,nevertheless,to realizethatan understandingof the
FirstAmendmentthatincludesprotectionfor manycommunicative
endeavorsthat bear no resemblanceto the town meeting or the
philosophyseminardoes not representa departurefrom the view
of free speech that underliesHolmes's marketmetaphor.
That the FirstAmendmentmaybe as muchaboutpoliticalcombat betweenideologicallycommitted,power-hungryactorsas about
disinterestedinquiryand deliberationalso suggestsa rationalefor
the clear-and-present-danger
test which Holmes elaboratedin the
Abramsdissent. The dominantforces of the communityare not
entitled to freeze themselvesin power, but they are entitled to
protect their interestsas they see them. Thus, speech can be regulatedwhen it is likely in light of the context of its dissemination
to lead directlyand immediatelyto tangibleharm, as definedby
what threatensthe materialinterestsof the dominantforces.Such
harmsare"substantive
evilsthatCongresshasa rightto prevent."'48
To disallow all preemptiveregulatoryauthorityregardingthem
would be to deny the dominantforces the power to protecttheir
interests.However,speech that is likely to cause harm only over
146

For an important development of this line of justification for the principle of freedom
of speech, see the chapter entitled "Free Expression and Personal Identification," inJoseph
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 131 (1994).
147 For
sophisticated arguments that demonstrate how difficult it is to determine the
proper scope of the freedom of speech, see C. Edwin Baker, Scopeof the First Amendment
Freedomof Speech,25 UCLA L Rev 964 (1978); Frederick Schauer, The Boundariesof the
First Amendment:A PreliminaryExplorationof ConstitutionalSalience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765
(2004); Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill and Pornography:Beyondthe Harm Principle 106
Ethics 621 (1996).
148 Schenckv United
States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919).
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time, if at all, cannot be regulated because the legitimate ongoing
process of displacing preexisting dominant forces with newly emergent dominant forces requires that such nonimminent and/or nonmaterial "harms" be permitted to occur. Political evolution, like
evolution in the natural world, is based on harm. Some groups,
previously dominant, lose out in the struggle for existence and necessarily suffer great harm. It is not one of the prerogatives of the
ascendancy of force to abort that evolutionary process.
Notice that this understanding of the clear-and-present-danger
test does not depend on the far-fetched assumption that, except
when the time frame is imminent, "more speech" ordinarily will
reach and dissuade potential wrongdoers who otherwise would be
prompted to act by the speaker's words. Holmes's position is that
sometimes we have to live with those remote harms. They can be
inseparable from adaptive political change. Notice also that the
legitimation of fundamental political opposition manifested by the
rejection of seditious libel goes far to explain the principle, explicitly
stated by Holmes earlier in the Abrams dissent149and integral to
the clear-and-present-dangertest, that speakerscannot be punished
for "the creed they avow"-that is, for their lack of commitment
to the ideals, symbols, and procedures around which the political
community is currently organized-but only for the material threat
their speeches and writings pose to the specific endeavors of the
community. The clear-and-present-danger test is not the only (or
necessarily the best) doctrinal standardthat one might derive from
placing the rejection of seditious libel at the heart of the First
Amendment, but Holmes's understanding of why the crime of seditious libel cannot be squared with the First Amendment provides
the best justification for the clear-and-present-dangertest.
V. CONCLUSION

In a lecture entitled "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy," delivered ten years before Holmes's Abrams dissent, John
Dewey observed:
The conceptionsthat had reignedin the philosophyof nature
andknowledgefor two thousandyears,the conceptionsthathad
become the familiarfurnitureof the mind, rested on the assumptionof the superiorityof the fixed and final;they rested
149

250 US at 629.
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upon treatingchangeandoriginas signsof defectandunreality.
In layinghandsupon the sacredarkof absolutepermanency,in
treatingthe formsthat had been regardedas typesof fixityand
perfectionas originatingand passingaway,the "Originof Species"introduceda mode of thinkingthat in the end was bound
to transformthe logic of knowledge,and hence the treatment
of morals,politics,and religion.'50
What the theory of evolution, the legitimation of fundamental political opposition, and the renunciation of philosophical absolutes
all have in common is an emphasis on change. Such emphasis is
shared also by free markets. That, I believe, is why Holmes's invocation of all four phenomena in his succinct justification for the
freedom of speech is more coherent, and less intellectually peripatetic, than is commonly assumed. A constitutional regime fearful
of political entrenchment and dedicated to continual adaptationhas
every reason to accord high priority to the freedom of speech and
to interpret that freedom with reference to the dynamism of free
markets. In this regard, the features of markets that merit attention
are those that also figure prominently in efficacious governance,
scientific inquiry, and natural selection: openness to new ideas and
capabilities, thirst for better information, responsiveness to changing conditions, encouragement of innovation and initiative, swift
punishment of rigidity, slowness, lack of awareness, or the failure
to audit. Whatever their limits and shortcomings, free markets are
a powerful force against inertia. So is free speech.
This reading of the Abrams dissent ascribes to Holmes a justification for the freedom of speech that rests not upon highly contentious epistemological and moral premises but rather on the historical acceptance of the political principle of legitimate opposition.
So interpreted, Holmes's argument is more modest, more persuasive, and of better constitutional pedigree than is often claimed.
The argument is not dependent on heroic assumptions regarding
human rationality or self-correcting social dynamics. It offers no
support to idealists who would turn his vision of free trade in ideas
into a charter for regulatory interventions designed to correct "market failures" in the domain of political and social disputation. As
Holmes understood the notion, the marketplace of ideas does not
offer the prospect of a just distribution of the opportunity to per150

John Dewey, The Influenceof Darwin on Philosophy,Popular Science Monthly (July
1909), reprinted in The Influenceof Darwin on Philosophyand Other Essays 1 (1997).
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suade.It does not offer the prospectof wisdomthroughmass deliberation,nor that of meaningfulpoliticalparticipationfor all interestedcitizens.What the marketplaceof ideasdoes offeris a much
needed counterweight,both conceptualand rhetorical,to illiberal
attitudesabout authorityand changeon which the censorialmen-

tality thrives. It honors certain charactertraits-inquisitiveness, capacity to admit error and to learn from experience, ingenuity, willingness to experiment, resilience-that matter in civic adaptation
no less than economic. It devalues deference and discredits certitude, and in the process holds various forms of incumbent authority
accountable to standards of performance. It offers a reason to interpret the First Amendment to protect some gestures of opposition
and resistance that have nothing to do with dialogue or dialectic.
In these respects, Holmes's arresting metaphor serves better as a
cultural statement than as a mechanism of social or intellectual
ordering. So conceived, it does valuable work.

